Ownership Change, Productivity, and Human Capital: New Evidence from Matched Employer-Employee Data in Swedish Manufacturing by Donald S. Siegel et al.
 
Working Papers in Economics 
 
Department of Economics, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 110 8
th Street, Troy, NY, 12180-3590, USA. Tel: +1-




Ownership Change, Productivity, and Human Capital: New 
Evidence  from  Matched  Employer-Employee  Data  in 
Swedish Manufacturing 
 
Donald S. Siegel 
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 
 
Kenneth L. Simons 
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 
 
Tomas Lindstrom 








For  more  information  and  to  browse  and  download  further  Rensselaer  Working  Papers  in 
Economics, please visit: http://www.rpi.edu/dept/economics/www/workingpapers/ 1
Ownership Change, Productivity, and Human Capital:




























Tel: +46 8-453 5900




Paper to be presented at the NBER/CRIW Conference on “Producer Dynamics: New Evidence from
Micro Data,” Bethesda, MD, April 9, 2005.  Comments from Rajshree Agrawal, John Haltiwanger,
Joe Mahoney, Mark Roberts, Anju Seth, and especially, Judith Hellerstein, are greatly appreciated.2
Ownership Change, Productivity, and Human Capital:
New Evidence from Matched Employer-Employee Data in Swedish Manufacturing
Abstract
Empirical studies of the impact of changes in ownership of manufacturing plants on
productivity (e.g., Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987, 1990a, 1990b), McGuckin and Nguyen (1995,
2001), and Maksimovic and Phillips (2001)) have provided limited evidence on how such
transactions affect investment in human capital and have been based strictly on U.S. and U.K. data. 
We attempt to fill these gaps, based on an analysis of matched employer-employee data from over
19,000 Swedish manufacturing plants for the years 1985-1998.   The sample covers virtually the
entire population of manufacturing plants with 20 or more employees and a probability-based
sample of smaller plants.  We assess whether there are differential effects on productivity and
human capital for different types of ownership changes, such as partial and full acquisitions and
divestitures, and related and unrelated acquisitions. 
Our results suggest that ownership change results in an increase in relative productivity. We
also find that plants involved in these transactions experience increases in average employee age,
experience, and the percentage of employees with a college education.  Ownership change also leads
to an increase in wages and a reduction in the percentage of female workers.  All of these patterns
emerge most strongly for full acquisitions and divestitures and unrelated acquisitions. 
Keywords: Mergers and Acquisitions, Total Factor Productivity (TFP), Human Capital
JEL Codes: G34, D24, C813
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1990s, there was a substantial increase in the volume of assets transferred through
mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures.  This trend was especially pronounced outside the U.S. 
Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu, and Zulehner (2003) report that the number of deals consummated in
Continental Europe increased from 986 during 1981-1990 to 8,609 during 1991-1998.   The authors
also note that the average value of these transactions rose from $186.1M in 1991 to $414.1M in
1998 (in constant dollars).  This new wave of corporate restructuring has stimulated an important
debate concerning whether these changes in ownership improve economic efficiency. 
Researchers typically address this question by analyzing the impact of ownership change on
short-run stock prices (“event studies”), long-run stock prices, or accounting profits (e.g.,
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987), Jensen (1988, 1993), and McWilliams and Siegel (1997)).   There
are several problems with the use of such performance indicators.  One problem with the use of
stock prices is that many economists question the validity of the “efficient markets” hypothesis
(see Shleifer (2001)), which conjectures that changes in share prices following announcements of
ownership changes reflect changes in future real economic performance.  This is a critical issue, since
market efficiency provides the basis for use of the event study methodology.  Furthermore,
McWilliams and Siegel (1997) have demonstrated that inadequate attention has been paid to research
design issues in many event studies.  Accounting profitability has long been known to be an
imperfect measure of economic performance (see Fisher and McGowan (1983). 
Policy decisions regarding the optimal level of ownership change should be based on analysis
of the effects of these transactions on economic efficiency.  It is also important to note that many
ownership changes involve privately-held companies or occur below the firm level (e.g., divisions of
large, publicly-traded firms), which makes it virtually impossible to assess stock price or accounting4
profitability effects, except for those transactions involving large, publicly-traded firms. The end
result is that analyses of ownership changes based solely on information from public companies
could yield misleading estimates of the antecedents and consequences of ownership changes.    
To overcome these limitations, several authors (e.g., Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987, 1990a,
1990b), McGuckin and Nguyen (1995), Maksimovic and Phillips (2001), Harris, Siegel, and Wright
(2005)) have asserted that a more desirable methodology is to assess the total factor productivity
(TFP) of plants before and after ownership changes.  Empirical evidence from the U.S. has been
derived from the Census Bureau's Longitudinal Research Database (LRD).
1  The LRD is a plant-
level file constructed by linking information from the quinquennial Census of Manufactures and the
Annual Survey of Manufactures.  Empirical evidence from the U.K. has been derived from the
Annual Respondents Database (ARD). The ARD consists of plant-level records from the U.K.
Annual Census of Production.  Several of these studies have been based on restricted samples (e.g., a
sample consisting mainly of long-lived plants or the universe of plants in one or two industries),
which potentially limits the ability to generalize from these findings.
A method to examine the relationship between productivity and ownership change, as well as
an interesting welfare analysis, is to examine how ownership change relates to characteristics of the
workforce.  Existing plant-level studies have provided limited evidence on how changes in corporate
control affect the demand for different types of workers.  For example one might examine impacts of
these transactions on male vs. female, Swedish-born vs. immigrant, young vs. old, and highly-
educated vs. non-highly-educated workers. 
The purpose of this study is to fill this gap, by relating productivity patterns associated with
ownership changes to such worker characteristics.  Our empirical analysis is based on matched
                     
1 Excellent reviews of LRD-based studies are presented in Caves (1998) and Bartelsman and Doms (2000).5
employer-employee data for over 19,000 Swedish manufacturing plants, which constitute the
majority of the country’s population of manufacturing plants, for the years 1985-1998.  Our sample
also includes information on every worker in those plants, along their complete work history during
this 14 year period.
We also assess whether there are differential effects on productivity and human capital for
different types of ownership changes: partial and full acquisitions and divestitures, and unrelated
and related diversification.  Finally, we present the first plant-level findings from Continental
Europe and also, compared to previous studies, have more recent data on ownership change. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a review and critique
of existing plant-level studies of the consequences of ownership change.  A discussion of various
theories relating to the impact of ownership change on economic performance is presented in Section
III.  Section IV describes the construction of the micro data set and its salient characteristics. 
Section V outlines the econometric methodology.  Section VI presents empirical results. The final
section contains preliminary conclusions.
II. REVIEW AND CRITIQUE OF PLANT-LEVEL STUDIES OF THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN OWNERSHIP CHANGE, PRODUCTIVITY, AND LABOR DEMAND 
A. Productivity
Table 1 presents a summary of plant-level studies of the relationship between ownership
change and productivity.  Several stylized facts emerge from this table.  The first is that there have
been no studies based on evidence from Continental Europe.   Second, most authors report that
plants involved in an ownership change experience an improvement in productivity after the change
in ownership.  Third, the magnitude of the productivity increase appears to vary by type of
ownership change (e.g., leveraged buyouts vs. management buyouts), which underscores the6
importance of disaggregating ownership change.  Fourth, evidence on relative productivity before
ownership change is mixed.  Some authors report that plants involved in ownership changes are less
productive than comparable plants before the change in ownership, while others report the
opposite.
These mixed results could be due to differences in the nature of the samples and the time
frames of the analyses.  Some authors have analyzed mostly large plants (e.g. Lichtenberg and Siegel
(1987, 1990b), while others have focused on a single industry (e.g., McGuckin and Nguyen (1995). 
Several papers use quinquennial Census of Manufactures data, which makes it difficult to analyze
timing effects with sufficient precision.  This is potentially important since studies based on annual
data indicate that major changes occur soon after the change in ownership. 
The first plant-level study of the relationship between ownership change and TFP was
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987), based on a balanced panel of 20, 493 U.S. LRD establishments in 450
manufacturing industries.  In subsequent empirical work (Lichtenberg and Siegel 1990a, 1990b), the
authors were able to analyze an unbalanced sample of LRD plants.  Their econometric analysis was
based on the following two-stage approach.  In the first stage, the authors computed residuals from
within-industry (4-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)) OLS regressions of log-linear
Cobb-Douglas production functions of the following form (with error term suppressed):
(1)   lnQit = β1lnKit +β2 lnLit +β3lnMit,
where Qit, Kit , Lit, and Mit refer to output, capital, labor, and materials, respectively, in plant i
and year t.  The residuals from equation (1) can be interpreted as an estimate of the relative
productivity of each plant (i.e., relative to plants in the same industry).  In the second stage of their7
model, the authors regressed the productivity residuals on a set of dummy variables denoting
whether the plant had changed owners:
(2)    RELPRODit = ƒ(OCit+)
     
where  RELPRODit is the productivity residual of plant i in year t, the error term is again
suppressed, and    OCit+  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if plant i was involved in an ownership
change in year    t +  (where   can be negative or positive) or 0 otherwise. 
McGuckin and Nguyen (1995) conducted a similar analysis of the effects of ownership
change on economic efficiency, based on the complete population of plants in the food
manufacturing industry (SIC 20) in the U.S. Census of Manufactures.  They used the same method
as in the previous LRD-based studies to construct estimates of relative TFP, as well as labor
productivity.  However, they did not employ precisely the same second-stage approach, since they
do not observe annual ownership changes, only those occurring between the quinquennial Census of
Manufactures. 
Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) computed similar measures of relative TFP, based on the
following translog production function (error term suppressed):
(3)
 




+β7 lnKit lnLit +β8lnKit lnMit +β9 lnLit lnMit +β10AGEi + µt,
where  αi is a plant-specific fixed effect,  µt  is a technology shift parameter, and  AGEit  denotes the
age of the plant. 
Table 1 reveals that most authors have used a two-stage method to assess the antecedents
and consequences of ownership change.  In contrast, we estimate within industry (4-digit SIC), one-
stage, augmented Cobb-Douglas production functions.  We also experimented with using similar8
one-stage translog production functions, and found that this had little effect on our empirical results.
 We conjecture that a one-stage estimation procedure provides more efficient econometric estimates
of the conventional arguments of the production function and other determinants of productivity
(e.g. a set of ownership change dummies) than those generated using the two-stage approach.
B. Labor Demand
Table 2 summarizes plant and firm-level studies of the impact of ownership change on
employment and wages.  Much of the plant-level evidence seems to indicate that ownership change
does not result in statistically significant declines in the employment and wages of production
workers at production establishments.  In fact, the most comprehensive evidence, presented in
McGuckin and Nguyen (2001), suggests that wages and employment increase after ownership
change.  On the other hand, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990a) find that employment and wage growth
are lower in central office or “auxiliary” establishments in the aftermath of an ownership change,
suggesting that white-collar workers suffer more than blue-collar employees when such transactions
occur.
Table 2 also reveals that these effects vary by type of ownership change.  For instance,
Baldwin (1998) reported that mergers had a negative impact on the employment and compensation
of non-production workers.  Similar patterns emerge in the aftermath of leveraged and management
buyouts.  Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) find that 45% of the firms involved in hostile
takeovers laid off workers, affecting about 6% of the workforce. 
To the best of our knowledge, there have been no empirical studies of the impact of the
effects of ownership change on the demand for different types of workers (e.g., men vs. women,
Swedish-born vs. immigrant, younger vs. older, highly-educated vs. non-highly-educated).  In the9
following section, we provide a brief summary of theories relating to the impact of ownership
change on performance.
III. BRIEF REVIEW OF THEORIES OF THE IMPACT OF OWNERSHIP CHANGE ON
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
Scholars have proposed numerous theories relating to the antecedents and consequences of
changes in ownership.   Several authors have asserted that corporate control changes reduce firm
performance.  This class of theories usually focuses on several managerial flaws.  For instance,
Dennis Mueller (1969) hypothesizes that managers attempt to maximize growth, instead of
shareholder wealth.  This leads corporate executives to adopt policies that benefit them financially
and professionally, at the expense of profit or shareholder wealth maximization.  Unfortunately,
these actions could lead to expansion of the firm beyond an optimal point.  
In a similar vein, Richard Roll (1986) and Mathew Hayward and Donald Hambrick (1997)
argue that the “hubris” of CEOs and other managers causes them to systematically overestimate
their ability to manage the companies they wish to acquire.  According to this view, “hubris”
induces managers to overpay for target firms, resulting in a decline in the economic performance of
the acquirer.    
Michael Gort (1968) advanced a theory predicting that ownership change has a neutral
impact on economic performance.   In his framework, ownership change is induced by divergent
expectations between buyers and sellers regarding the future value of corporate assets.  He also
seeks to explain fluctuations in merger activity over time.  Thus, his model predicts that the
magnitude of differences in buyer and seller expectations of the share prices of target firms is  likely
to be higher during periods of “economic disturbance,” which he defines as periods of sustained
share price increases or when firms experience rapid technological change.  Note that Gort’s model is10
a variation of the familiar theme of stockholder wealth maximization. That is, he assumes that the
market expects no gain to result from the merger because acquirers have different expectations than
the market.  Therefore, the premium earned by the acquired firm is exactly offset by a loss to the
acquiring firm's shareholders.  
Several theories predict that ownership change has a positive effect on economic
performance.  James Meade (1968) asserted that takeovers are part of a process of “natural
selection,” whereby efficient managers are “rewarded” through survival, while inefficient managers
are “punished” via takeovers.  According to Henry Manne (1965) and Michael Jensen (1988), the
takeover threat constrains the self-serving behavior of managers, and induces them to pursue profit
maximizing strategies.  Jensen (1993) extends this theory by noting that certain types of ownership
changes (e.g., management buyouts) result in changes in governance and incentive structures that
reduce agency costs.  These agency costs could be substantial in large corporations, where there is
considerable separation of ownership and control. 
Frank Lichtenberg and Donald Siegel (1987) advanced a “matching” theory of ownership
change, in which the “fit” between heterogeneous plants and owners is reflected in productivity. 
The matching theory of ownership change borrows heavily from the theory of labor turnover or job
separation proposed by Jovanovic (1979).  In the Lichtenberg and Siegel framework, low
productivity signals a bad match, which is the key determinant of the firm level decision to maintain
or relinquish ownership of a given plant.  The model has two empirical implications.  The lower the
productivity of a plant, relative to average productivity in its industry, the higher the probability of
ownership change.  When an ownership change occurs, even an average match can be expected to
lead to above average productivity growth because a better match will result. 11
Thomas Holmes and James Schmitz (1990) outlined an equilibrium model of ownership
change (or “business transfer”) that pertains mainly to smaller firms.  In their model, high quality
managers buy companies that implement high quality projects based on new ideas.  Jovanovic and
Rousseau (2002, 2004) also assert that high quality projects and high quality managers are
complements.  Moreover, they assert that mergers and takeovers play a role in spreading new
technologies and reallocating capital to more efficient uses and to better managers.   Thus, according
to the authors, ownership change plays a role that is similar to the efficiency-enhancing, dynamic
adjustment associated with entry and exit.  The notion that technological change and ownership
change are complements suggests that these transactions should result in a decline in employment
and “skill upgrading.”
2
Many of the above theories of ownership change do not have obvious implications for
changes in the workforce below the top management level.  Indeed, for ownership changes that occur
according to the logic of the theories advanced by Mueller, Roll, Hayward and Hambrick, and Gort,
one might be surprised to observe in the wake of ownership change any substantial changes in a
plant’s workforce.  In contrast, at least some of the theories that predict an improvement in
productivity suggest that this enhancement may arise due to new managers’ changes to the
workforce.  Indeed, the theory of Jovanovic and Rousseau specifically addresses such changes. 
Thus, evidence on the degree to which workforce changes occur may shed light on the frequency
with which at least the latter theories of ownership change apply to actual plants.
In the following section, we describe the data set that allows us to assess the impact of
ownership on performance and workforce characteristics. 
                     
2 There is considerable evidence in the literature on “skill-biased technological change” (see Siegel (1999) for a
comprehensive review of this literature) that technological change is associated with downsizing and skill-upgrading of
the workforce.12
IV. DATA
Our empirical analysis is based on a special file that links detailed information on Swedish
workers and the establishments that employ them.  This file has data on the output and inputs of
these plants, which enables us to construct estimates of total factor productivity (TFP).  It also
contains information on a wide variety of worker characteristics, such as level of education, age,
gender, and national origin.
A. Plants
The primary unit of observation in our study is the plant.  Following conventional
international standards, the plant or establishment is defined as a physically independent unit within
a firm.  It is assumed that each plant focuses on just one “line of business” (i.e., one activity).  If a
company is involved in multiple activities at the same physical address, the firm is asked to report
separate figures for each activity. Each figure is then tied to a separate plant.  In most cases,
however, firms focus on a single activity, implying that the local units are seldom split into several
plants.  Plants that were considered to be “non-active” and “help plants,” such as sales offices (or
what would be considered “auxiliary” establishments in the U.S.), were also excluded from the data.
According to Swedish law, each business is required to report information to Statistics
Sweden on an annual basis.  In 1946, the certainty criterion for inclusion in the annual survey of
manufacturing plants was established at a minimum of 5 employees and 10,000 SEK (about 1,300
US dollars) in production value.  In 1990, this certainty threshold was raised to a minimum of 10
employees, while a sampling procedure is applied to the smaller plants.  In 1997, the certainty13
threshold officially was raised to a minimum of 20 employees, but as will be seen shortly, evolving
sampling procedures for smaller plants meant that this change had little effect.
3
Tables 3 through 5 compare our sample of 19,010 plants to the population of Swedish
manufacturing establishments.  The top panel of Table 3 indicates that over half of our
establishments fall in the range of 10-49 employees, although both tails of the size distribution are
well represented.  Comparing the counts of plants with less than 20 employees across years, the
changes in sampling procedure in 1990 and 1997 appear to have had only a limited effect on the
composition of the sample.  As shown in the bottom panel of Table 3, the larger size classes
represent a larger fraction of total (population) employment.  This not only indicates that most
workers tend to work for large plants, but also reflects the fact that larger establishments are
sampled more thoroughly than smaller plants. 
Table 4 compares the size distribution of our sample (top panel) with corresponding values
for the population of Swedish manufacturing plants (bottom panel) in 1986, 1990, and 1995.  These
figures reveal that our sample is not completely representative in terms of size, since it is more
heavily weighted towards plants with more than 10 employees.  On the other hand, Table 5
indicates that the sample constitutes a large fraction of economic activity in the manufacturing
sector, especially for plants with more than 10 employees. 
B. Ownership Change
Table 6 presents statistics on the incidence of ownership change.  Over the entire sample
period (1985-1998), 5.1 % of plants experienced at least one ownership change.  These rates of
plant turnover appear to be slightly higher when they are weighted by value-added and employment
                     
3 We have a small number of mining plants in our sample.  The threshold increases in 1990 and 1997 only affected
manufacturing plants. 14
(columns 2 and 3).  An analysis of the annual figures reveals that the incidence of ownership change
appears to have risen during the late 1980s, reaching a peak in the early 1990s.
In Table 7, we present evidence on the incidence of several types of ownership change
involving our sample of plants during the sample period (1986-1998).  We can identify whether an
acquisition or divestiture involves the buying or selling of an entire firm.  Note that the
overwhelming majority of such changes are full acquisitions or divestitures, although the relative
importance of such transactions diminishes when they are weighted by value-added or employment
(columns 2 and 3).  We have also identified whether the buyer has existing plants in the same (4-
digit) industry, which we refer to as a related acquisition. 
C. Capital
A critical issue in the calculation of total factor productivity (TFP) is construction of a capital
measure.  Some researchers avoid analyzing TFP, and instead, compute labor productivity (LP),
which is easier to measure.  We will present econometric results based on both TFP and LP.  We
calculated estimates of the capital stock as follows: initial values of capital were estimated in 1989,
based on the assumption of a constant capital-to-sales ratio across all plants in each 2-digit SIC
industry. Using these initial estimates, capital is constructed using the usual perpetual inventory
algorithm, Kit
c = (1− δ
c)Kit−1
c + ρtIit
c , where i denotes a plant, t denotes a year, c is either machinery
or buildings & land, K denotes capital, I denotes investment, δ denotes the depreciation rate, and ρ
denotes an investment deflator.
4  The capital estimates for machinery plus buildings and land were
summed to create a single combined capital stock measure,Kit .
                     
4 The depreciation rate for machinery was allowed to differ by 3-digit SIC industry and was taken from figures of the
OECD, while a constant figure of 0.0314 was used for buildings and land.  Investments were deflated using
manufacturing-sector-wide annual investment deflators reported by Statistics Sweden.  We rely on figures kindly
provided by M. Carlsson and replicate and extend the methods he used.15
D. Employees
Matched employee-level data come from a database on the jobs and earnings of every
employee in Sweden.  The data are based on tax filings and hence record each employee’s annual
earnings, which distinguish year-long work-related earnings (which we term “wage”) from other
earnings.
5  Employment is recorded in November of each year, and the records match employees
(with a tiny percentage of missing cases among our manufacturing employees) to specific plants,
firms, and (5-digit SIC) industries.  Since the database covers all employees as needed for relevant
tax records, we are able to infer that any employee whose record is missing in a given year was not
employed in Sweden in that year.  The full database contains 36,398,617 records across the 14 years
of data from 1985 to 1998, for an average of 2.6 million workers per year, consistent with the
Swedish population of close to 9 million.  Among all of the records, 9,251,962 records pertain to
cases in which a person is employed by a manufacturing plant in our sample during the relevant
year.
The employee data include information on the gender, national origin, year of birth, most
recent year of education, and number of years of education for each employee.  We use this
information to construct measures at the plant and employee levels of workforce characteristics.  At
the plant level, we assess (in each year) the percentage of workers who are male vs. female, the
percentage who were born in Sweden vs. immigrated, the mean age of employees, mean years of
experience, as proxied by the number of years elapsed since their last year of education, and the
percentage of employees with at least some college-level education.  At the employee level, we
assess (in each year) the gender of the employee, whether he or she was born in Sweden, is below or
above the mean age, below or above the mean level of experience, and educational status, based on16
the following four categories: (a) less than a high school education (up to 10 years apparently
equivalent to U.S. grade 8), (b) high school education (up to 14 years apparently equivalent to U.S.
grade 12), (c) at least some college- or technical-school education, (d) and at least some PhD-level
studies.  For our analysis of employee turnover in the aftermath of ownership change (where do
“old” employees go and where do “new” employees come from), we also assessed whether
employees transitioned to jobs in the same 4-digit SIC industry versus jobs in other manufacturing
or non-manufacturing industries, and whether each employee was working in Sweden in each year.
6
V. ECONOMETRIC MODELS
A. Types of Models
In this version of the paper, we estimate two types of model.  For analyses of labor and
total factor productivity,
(4)  lnQit = ƒit + ωit
where Qit denotes plant i’s output in year t,  ƒit  is the logarithm of plant i’s production function in
year t, and  ωit  is an efficiency residual.  The efficiency residual is assumed to be influenced by
ownership change and other variables, as follows:
(5)
     
ωit = γ OCit−
=−13
12
∑ + ′ δ xit + εit
where 




∑  parameterizes the relation to ownership change as discussed below, δ  is a
                                                                                 
5 The data do not include hours worked or hourly wages, only the employee’s annual total income from employment.
6 Employees’ 4-digit SIC industries of employment were assessed using 1969 SICs where possible, for comparability
with the plant-level analyses.  However, 1969 SICs were not available in all years of data, so 1992 SICs were used to
assess industry of employment when 1969 SICs were not available in both the year in question and the comparator
year. 17
vector of coefficients, xit  is a vector of control variables for plant i in year t, and  εit  is the remaining
efficiency residual.  Rewriting (4) thus yields
(6)
     
lnQit = ƒit + γ OCit−
=−13
12
∑ + ′ δ xit + εit .
Other analyses, which are not based on estimation of a production function, assume the same form:
(7)
     
yit = α + γ OCit−
=−13
12
∑ + ′ δ zit + εit ,
where  yit  is the dependent variable in question (e.g., employment or wages), α is an intercept
parameter, and the other terms are as defined above.
B. Ownership Change
The treatment of ownership change in the econometric analysis requires careful
consideration.  In equations (5)-(7),  denotes the year relative to the year of ownership change, so
that negative values of  signify years preceding ownership change,   = 0  denotes the year during
which the plant changed owners, and positive values of   pertain to years following ownership
change.   OCit−  is a dummy variable that equals   if plant i’s owner changed (with certainty)  
years preceding the current year t for   > 0, or    years following the current year for   < 0, or 0
otherwise.  Note that our sample allows us to identify each plant’s owner for the years 1985
through 1998, so a new owner can be identified in each year for 1986 through 1998.  For a plant
observed in 1985, we wish to know whether an ownership change will occur for up to 13 years in
the future, while for a plant observed in 1998, we wish to know whether an ownership change
occurred up to 12 years in the past.  This consideration of past and future ownership changes yields
a possible range of leads and lags from –13 to +12.18
The relation of past and future ownership change to productivity, size, or workforce
characteristics can then be assessed, at each value of  , by including in the model the terms




∑ , where  γ   parameterizes the relation to ownership change at lead/lag  .  To avoid
model specification bias, each  γ   is unconstrained and is estimated over the full range of   from –13
to +12.  The fitted terms of  γ   provide estimates of the relationship of ownership change to
productivity, size, and workforce characteristics in each year.
C. Avoiding Biases
If just the ownership change dummies were included as regressors, the estimates would be
subject to sample selection and measurement error biases.  Sample selection bias would result
because for large positive or negative values of  , the ownership change variable  OCit−  equals one
only if the plant survived a large number of years (at least  −+1 years for   < 0 or at least  + 2
years for   ≥ 0).  Any characteristics of surviving plants, such as higher productivity, would thus
be partially attributed to ownership change. 
Measurement error bias would also result, given that ownership changes are unmeasured
when they occur outside the sample time frame.  For example, for   = −13,  OCit−  can equal one
only if  t =1985 (so  t −  =1998); for other values of t information about ownership changes is
unavailable (since  t −  >1998, the last year of data), causing, by definition,  OCit− = 0 .  Similarly;
for   = −12,  OCit−  can equal 1 only if t ≤1986; …; for    = −1,  OCit−  can equal 1 only if
 t ≤1997; for   = 0 ,  OCit−  can equal 1 only if  t ≥1986; …; for   =12 ,  OCit−  can equal 1 only if
 t =1998.  If observations are evenly dispersed across years and the probability of ownership
change remains constant at p over time, the expected value of  OCit−  would equal 1/14 p for19
  = −13 (as it is artificially 0 in 13 of 14 years of data), 2/14 p for   = −12, …, 13/14 p for   = −1
or   = 0 , …, 1/14 p for   =12 .  Thus, values of  OCit−  would constitute error-ridden indicators of
ownership change, with the error greatest for the largest (absolute) values of  .  If these ownership
change measures are uncorrelated with each other and with all other regressors, the resulting
coefficient estimates would be biased toward zero, with the greatest bias for estimates at large
(absolute) values of  .  If the true coefficients all equaled the same constant number c, the expected
values of the estimates would follow a U-shape (if c < 0 ) or inverted-U-shape (if c > 0 ).  Hence
both sample selection and measurement biases could confound our analysis of the relationship
between ownership change and plant performance.
Such biases can be especially severe when researchers use a balanced panel (e.g., Lichtenberg
and Siegel (1987)), restrict the range of   (McGuckin and Nguyen (1995)), or analyze pre- versus
post-acquisition periods using a single coefficient for each.   For example, the use of a balanced panel
imparts a strong selection bias, because the analysis is based only on those plants that survived
during the sample period.  Restrictions on the range of   effectively constrain  γ   to equal zero
outside of the range, yielding possible specification error.  Pre- versus post-acquisition periods
effectively constrain  γ   to be identical across values of   and hence constitute an additional source
of specification error.  Moreover none of these approaches entirely gets rid of the sample selection
and measurement biases pointed out above, unless all data points are dropped from analysis if they
are within L+1 years of the start and L years of the end of the sample and the range of   is
constrained to  −L ≤  ≤ L.
We hypothesize that there is a way to address this problem without excluding any
observations.  The intended comparison is between plants that experienced ownership change in
year  t −  and those that could have but did not experience ownership change in year  t −  (not20
between plants that did experience, versus those that might have or could not have experienced,
ownership change).  For each  , we divide the observations into three types of establishments: (i)
plants that did experience ownership change in year  t − , (ii) plants that could have but did not
experience ownership change in year  t − , and (iii) plants that did not exist or those for which it is
unknown whether they experienced ownership change in year  t − .  To ensure that the coefficients
 γ   describe the difference between categories (i) and (ii), it is sufficient to introduce into the model a
dummy variable    NDit− that equals 1 for any observations meeting condition (iii) in year  t −  and 0
for all other observations.  This gives rise to one additional variable for each  , yielding the sum




∑ , comparable to the ownership change term in the models.   NDit−  implies either no
data about whether ownership change occurred in year  t − , or nonexistence of the plant in year
 t − .  Hence these controls potentially remove a substantial source of potential bias in the
estimates.  Indeed, in simulations we have found substantial bias without these controls but no bias
once they are introduced.
To reduce another possible bias, caused by cross-industry, cross-year, or cross-plant-age
differences in both the probability of acquisition and the dependent variable (or productivity),
additional controls are used.  Fixed effect dummies are included in all analyses for each year, 4-digit
industry (according to 1969 Swedish SICs), and plant age.
7,8  In addition, production function
parameters are each allowed to differ by industry, effectively, by including interaction terms that
                     
7 Industries must be defined according to 1969 industries because only in the later years of the sample have plants been
classified according to more recent industry definitions.  Another limitation of the data is that they do not include plant
ages, so plants are classified according to their minimum age (1+, 2+, …) if they existed in 1985 or their actual age if
they entered after 1985.  Fortunately an additional file was available that indicated (for nearly all plants) whether each
plant existed in each year, even if it was not present in the sample used here; this file allowed identification of plant age
without sample selection in years 1985-1998.
8 We also experimented with including detailed geographic region dummies in the TFP equation, and found that their
inclusion had almost no effect on our results.21
equal industry-specific dummies (Ikit =1 if plant i’s primary industry is equal to k or Ikit = 0
otherwise) times each production function parameter.  Use of these controls implies that the
relations of ownership change are studied largely for plants of comparable industry and age at a
comparable date.
D. The Endogeneity Issue and Descriptive Estimation
It is common in the estimation of production functions to  use instrumental variables or
related  methods  to  ensure  consistent  parameter  estimates,  despite  possible  endogeneity  in
parameters.  In our context, ownership change may be an endogenous variable since for example, as
some of the theories conjecture, the sale of a plant or firm may be more likely when it has relatively
low productivity.  Just as instrumental variables can be used to estimate either a supply  equation or
a demand equation rather than a mixture of the two, so they  could be used in our context to aid
analyses of the causes or consequences of ownership change.
In the present paper, however, our aim is not to estimate either causes or consequences, but
merely to describe patterns  experienced on  average before and after plants  undergo ownership
change.  Since instrumental variable techniques would, by their intended nature, bias the estimates
away from the unadulterated empirical patterns intended for observation here, they are reserved for
other studies.  Instead we descriptively estimate trends before and after ownership change.
9 
                     
9 The focus on unadulterated empirical patterns matches the descriptive focus of the NBER conference for which this
paper was developed, and accords with the wishes of the conference organizers.22
VI. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A. Descriptive Statistics for Plant-Level Variables
Table 8 contains descriptive statistics for key variables used in the econometric analysis,
presented separately for plants that experience an ownership change and for those that do not.  We
find that plants involved in these transactions tend to be larger by about 60%.
10  They employ on
average slightly smaller percentages of female workers and of workers with at least a college
education, and have slightly more non-Swedish employees than plants that do not experience an
ownership change.
B. Productivity, Output, and Employment as Related to Ownership Change
To begin, consider changes in productivity and plant size associated with ownership change.
 Table 9 presents OLS estimates of four equations: labor productivity, total factor productivity,
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where Lijt , Kijt, and Mijt are labor, capital and materials for plant i in industry j at year t,  OCijt−
and  NDijt−  are the ownership change and “no-data” dummy variables described earlier, and yijt is
output or employment for plant i in industry j at year t.
11  Recall that each regression is estimated
with detailed industry level (4-digit SIC) fixed effects.  Thus, the coefficients on the non-ownership
change variables (labor, capital and materials) are weighted means of industry-specific coefficients.
 The coefficients on labor, capital, and materials in the two productivity models appear to be
plausible.  They are reasonably close to their respective factor shares and strongly suggestive of
constant returns to scale.
12  The total factor productivity (TFP) equation is estimated for a
restricted sample of plants and years, because the capital measure is only available from 1989
onward and, in those years, for 92.3% of plants.
Next, we focus our attention on the coefficients on the ownership change dummies in Table
9.  For example, the value -.042 for the estimated coefficient of OC−1 in the labor productivity
equation signifies that plants experiencing an ownership change one year hence were 4.2 percent less
productive, on average, than comparable establishments that did not change owners.  Note that
while the relative performance of plants changing owners was significantly worse before the
                     
11 The equations deliberately do not include plant fixed effects, only industry fixed effects, because including plant
fixed effects would make it impossible to observe whether plants that experience ownership change tend to have
persistently low or high productivity or indeed to know how these plants compare to their industry (and age and time)
averages at all – all patterns that are important to be able to detect.
12 95% confidence intervals for returns to scale are (1.031, 1.047) in the LP equation and (1.008, 1.016) in the TFP
equation.24
transaction, relative efficiency appears to improve after the ownership change, in the sense that such
establishments appear to converge to the average level of industry performance.  The LP estimates
indicate lower than average productivity before ownership change, followed by a rapid increase to
the industry norm, and ultimately, higher productivity following the ownership change.  The TFP
estimates indicate productivity steadily deteriorating to a low of nearly 6 percent below average
followed by a steady return to average and higher productivity after the ownership change.
The output and employment results, which are presented in the last two columns of Table 9, help
explain the productivity increase.  Plants that change owners appear to have higher levels of output
and employment than comparable plants both before and after ownership change.  It appears that
they reduce both output and employment after an ownership change.  However, employment
declines at a faster rate than output, which results in a productivity increase.
  In Table 10, we present averages of the coefficients on the ownership change dummies in the
LP, TFP, output, and employment equations for 5 years before and 5 years after the transaction
(we exclude year 0, which is the year of the acquisition).  In the third row of each panel, we report
the growth in the average coefficient from the 5 years before to the 5 years after ownership change,
and we formally test whether the post vs. pre ownership change effects are statistically significant. 
Our findings are also presented separately in Table 10 for various types of ownership change:  full
acquisitions and partial acquisitions, full divestitures and partial divestitures, related acquisitions,
unrelated acquisitions, and changes in ownership involving a single firm. 
The “post-pre” results in the first panel of Table 10 confirm our earlier assertion that plants
involved in an ownership change become more productive after the transaction.  From the 5 years
before to the 5 years after ownership change, labor productivity is estimated to have increased by
4.1% (p<.001) and TFP by 1.7% (p<.01).  We also find that output and employment are reduced25
after ownership change, with employment declining more than output.  Output is estimated to have
declined by 8.6% (p<.001) from the pre- to post-ownership change 5-year periods, and
employment is estimated to have decreased by 12.0% (p<.001).
The growth in labor productivity is estimated to be much higher for full acquisitions and
divestitures than for partial acquisitions and divestitures (panels 2-5 of Table 10).  In full-firm
acquisitions and divestitures both, labor productivity grew an estimated 4.7% between the two 5-
year periods (both p<.001).  In contrast, partial acquisitions are associated with only 0.8% growth
in labor productivity, while partial divestitures are associated with a decrease of 0.1% in labor
productivity (both changes are insignificantly different from zero).  The difference may stem from
the fact that plants acquired through partial acquisition and divestiture had higher labor productivity
to begin with, 1.1% above the norm form partial acquisitions and 1.9% above the norm for partial
divestitures, versus labor productivity averaging 5.5% below the industry norm for full acquisitions
and 5.2% below the industry norm for partial divestitures.
 13
Growth in TFP was much more similar across full versus partial acquisitions and
divestitures.  Partial acquisitions are estimated to have experienced slightly higher (2.6%) TFP
growth between the two 5-year periods than either full acquisitions (1.4%) or any type of
divestiture (1.5% to 1.7%), but the difference is not statistically significant.  All types of
acquisitions and divestitures involved plants whose TFP was about 3.0% to 3.8% below the norm
before ownership change.
Labor productivity grew more in the aftermath of unrelated acquisitions, as opposed to
related acquisitions, and even more in ownership changes that did not involve a second
(manufacturing) firm.  Among these three types of ownership change, the increase in labor26
productivity was negatively related to initial productivity: single-firm ownership changes increased
their LP an estimated 5.2% (p<.001) from 5.9% below the norm to 0.7% above the norm, while
unrelated acquisitions saw LP increase an estimated 3.3% (p<.05) from 1.3% below the norm to
2.0% above the norm, and related acquisitions saw LP increase only an estimated 1.5% (statistically
insignificant) from 0.5% above the norm to 2.1% above the norm.  TFP growth was substantial and
significant, but was greatest for related acquisitions, with 3.4% growth (p<.05) from an initial base
4.3% below the norm, whereas the unrelated and single-firm ownership changes respectively
experienced only 2.4% (insignificant) and 1.3% (p<.10) TFP growth from initial bases 3.4% and
3.7% below the norm.  The finding that unrelated acquisitions enhance plant productivity is
consistent with U.S. evidence presented in Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) and Schoar (2002). 
 The decline in output and especially, employment was greatest in the aftermath of full
acquisitions and divestitures, for which output declined 11.6% (p<.001) and 10.4% (p<.001),
respectively, and employment declined 15.6% (p<.001) and 14.4% (p<.001) respectively. In
contrast, partial acquisitions and divestitures respectively experienced an estimated 7.6% (p<.05)
and 9.0% (p<.05) decline in output and 7.3% (p<.05) and 7.7% (p<.05) decline in employment. 
Partial acquisitions and divestitures tended to involve plants that were substantially larger to begin
with, starting larger than the norm by an estimated 63.3% and 68.4% respectively, versus only 6.1%
and 9.2% for full acquisitions and divestitures.  The declines in output and employment are
estimated to have been greater for unrelated acquisitions than for related acquisitions, but there is no
statistically significant difference between the related and unrelated (and single-firm) acquisitions.
Both the annual coefficient estimates and the 5-year means for all ownership changes
combined are shown graphically in Figures 1-4.  These graphs make it easy to visualize the relation
                                                                                 
13 These differences pre-ownership change might stem from higher labor productivity in larger plants or from cherry-27
of the four variables to ownership change, and moreover clarify annual patterns that are not evident
in the 5-year means.  The horizontal axis in each graph spans a 15-year period, from 7 years before
ownership change to 7 years after ownership change.  The vertical axis corresponds to the values of
the estimated coefficients, and hence to the relation of ownership change to productivity, output, or
employment at a given time relative to the year of ownership change.  The curve drawn across the
diagram shows the annually changing values of productivity relative to the industry (and age and
year) norm.  For each coefficient estimate, its 95% confidence band clarifies the range of error in the
estimates.  Lighter lines in the 5 years pre- and post-ownership change indicate 95% confidence
bands for means before and after ownership change, and a 95% band drawn at year 0 pertains to the
change between the 5-year periods pre- to post-ownership change.
The graphs demonstrate that the 5-year means discussed often hide important dynamics in
the variables, as related to the time of ownership change.  For labor productivity, the 5-year means
are a reasonable summary, but for TFP, they hide a massive and statistically significant decline in
productivity up to the time of ownership change, followed by substantial growth in productivity
that begins immediately after the year of ownership change.  The pattern indeed looks as if typical
plants had been losing TFP relative to the norm at a pace of about 1% per year before ownership
change, with the new owners apparently managing to enhance productivity by about 4% within one
year after ownership change and continuing to enhance productivity by about 0.5% per year
thereafter.
The graphs for real output and employment also indicate substantial disruptions in the year
of ownership change, with plants formally about 15% above the norm in output and 20% above the
norm in employment suddenly falling to levels near their industry (and age and year) means.  Under
                                                                                 
picking by acquiring firms that purchase only some of a firm’s plants.28
the new ownership, output (especially) and employment (somewhat) then grew immediately in the
year following ownership change, with very slow increases in subsequent years.
C. Labor Force Characteristics as Related to Ownership Change
In Table 11, we present similar results for six labor-related dependent variables:  the average
age of employees at the plant, average experience, the percentage of female employees, the
percentage of non-Swedish employees, the percentage of college-educated workers, and wages.  As
before, the table includes estimates for the various types of ownership change.  Figures 5-10 present
graphical representations of the annual coefficient estimates for all ownership changes combined. 
The findings in Table 11 imply that plants involved in ownership change experience
estimated increases in average employee age by 0.16 year or about 2 months of age (p<.05) , in
experience by 0.17 year (p<.01), and in the percentage of employees with a college education by (an
absolute amount of) 0.18% (p<.05).  The age and experience results suggest some tendency for
newer workers to be laid off or leave more often than older workers.  The education result suggests
that ownership change leads to a reduction in the demand for less-educated workers.  We also find
that ownership change results in an increase in employees’ mean wages (as always, relative to the
industry and plant age and year norm) by 1.3% (p<.001) and a decline in the percentage of female
workers by (an absolute amount of) 0.65% (p<.01).  The increase in wages is consistent with more
experienced employees remaining, while newer workers leave, if indeed the older and more
experienced workers receive higher wages.  The decline in the percentage of female workers might be
related to women workers often having shorter job durations than men, and hence being more likely
to lose a job because of short job tenure and experience.
Paralleling the declines in output and employment, most of these patterns are strongest for
full acquisitions and divestitures and unrelated acquisitions.  If employers shed workers with low29
tenure most frequently, and full acquisitions and divestitures and unrelated acquisitions experience
the greatest decrease in workforce, then these patterns are to be expected.  The percentage of female
workers, for example, falls by an estimated (absolute amount of) 0.83% for full acquisitions
(p<.001) versus only 0.26% for partial acquisitions (insignificant).
 The different types of ownership change appear to relate differently to human capital. 
Although the differences are not all statistically significant, partial acquisitions and divestitures
(compared to full acquisitions and divestitures) involved plants that start with higher mean
percentages of college-educated workers, and are associated with larger increases in the percentage of
college-educated workers.  This suggests a tendency for plants involved in partial acquisitions or
divestitures to use more highly-educated employees and for new owners to increase the plant’s
reliance on highly-educated employees.
The annual estimated coefficients in Figures 5-10 reaffirm the above conclusions, but suggest
that at least some of the estimated changes are gradual processes.  In particular, mean employee age
and experience increase gradually, and the percentage of female workers declines gradually, over a
period of several years following ownership change.  There are multiple possible interpretations of
these patterns, but one interpretation involves employees not fully losing their connection with a
plant even if they were laid off temporarily during the year of ownership change, and the new
owners often gradually shifting to a workforce that suits their demands.
Two additional stylized facts emerge from these figures.  The percentage of college-educated
workers may actually increase in the year before ownership change, although the ranges of error
involved leave some uncertainty in this conclusion.  Note also that wages plummet (significantly)
relative to the norm in the year preceding ownership change.  Interpretations of the decrease in
wages include lower salary increases in times of low plant profitability, and fewer hours worked by30
the average worker as plants experiencing problems begin to curtail production activities.  (As the
latter interpretation reminds the reader, the wage variable is total wages paid over the year, not an
hourly wage.)
D. Where Pre-Ownership Change Employees Go
Next, we make use of the individual-level data, in order to track the movement and relative
compensation of workers whose establishments were involved in ownership change.  In doing so,
we attempt to answer two questions: (1) where do the “old” employees go? and (2) where do the
“new” employees come from?  
Table 12 presents statistics on the destination (if any) of employees who plants experienced
ownership change.  The top panel of Table 12 pertains to all employees, while the second panel
relates to all employees who leave their plant.  Each panel indicates the percentage of employees
who have the following characteristics: female, non-Swedish born, age above  the  mean of  all
manufacturing employees, experience above the mean of  all manufacturing employees, and four
categories of educational achievement: less than high school, at least some high school, at least some
college-level study, and at least some PhD-level study.  The bottom panels of the table show the
corresponding sample sizes for all employees and for employees who leave their plant.
14 
The first column is the base case, pertaining to employees whose plants did not  change
owner in the subsequent year.   In this and other  columns on  the  table, observations in which
ownership change occurred in the previous or following year are excluded to avoid contaminating
data in nearby years.  Also, the observations considered are all employee-year combinations for
whom their plant meets the required categorization regarding the type of ownership change it was
                     
14 Because the years of experience and education level variables are not available for some employees, sample sizes are
also reported for the number of employees for whom values of these variables are available.31
about to experience.  Subsequent columns of the table address the  various types  of  ownership
change considered earlier. 
Table 12 confirms the findings of the plant-level analyses, concerning which  types  of
employees are most likely to leave in the wake of an  ownership  change.   For  example, the
percentages of female and non-Swedish born employees in plants experiencing ownership change are
lower  than  the  corresponding  percentages  among  employees  leaving  plants  that  experience
ownership change, consistent with the slight decreases in these types of employees observed at a
time of high loss of workforce.  Similarly the table shows a disproportionately low percentage of
older and more-experienced employees leaving plants that experience ownership change.
The individual-level results differ somewhat from the plant-level results presented earlier. 
Table  12  reveals  that  even  among  plants  that  do  not  experience  ownership,  relatively  high
percentages of women and non-Swedish born employees leave plants.    Thus,  while ownership
change may result in substantial job loss for these types  of workers, it appears as though they are
not treated more unfairly in plants experiencing ownership change than in representative plants (in
fact, the evidence suggests they  are treated slightly more fairly, perhaps  because of differing job
roles).
15
In Tables 13 and  14,  we  follow  workers  at  the  end  of  year  T-1  and  measure their
employment status and wage growth, respectively, at the end of year T+1, cross-classified by a set
of dummy variables denoting whether the plant that employed them during year T-1 experienced an
ownership change (also by type  of ownership change) during year T.
16  Note that if an ownership
                     
15 Some care must be taken in comparing findings at the plant and employee levels not only because of the complexity
of deciphering the flows of employees, but also because the plant-level analyses control for industry, plant age, and year
effects while the employee-level results simply present outcomes for average employees.
16 The focus on years T-1 and T+1, rather than times separated by only one year, is necessitated by the timing of when
ownership changes occur and when employee information is reported.  Recall that employee information pertains to
November, while ownership change can occur at any time during the reporting year.  If years T-1 and T were used, it32
change occurs, workers can be employed at the same plant, at another plant owned by the previous
owner, at another plant owned by the new owner, by another firm in the same industry, by another
firm in a different industry, in an unknown industry or plant (which likely includes workers who
become  self-employed  or  who  are  employed  at  an  entrepreneurial  startup),  or  they  can  be
unemployed.
The findings in Table 13 are consistent with the plant-level results cited earlier, in the sense
that ownership change appears to be associated with an increase in worker turnover at plants and
firms.  For example, only 62.7% of the workers observed at the end of year of T-1 whose plants
changed owners during year T were still employed at the same establishment at the end of Year
T+1.  Note that this pattern of “churning” is strongest for full acquisitions, full divestitures, and
single-firm ownership changes.  Turnover findings are also presented separately for different types
of workers.  Not surprisingly, these results imply that men, non-Swedes, younger employees, and
less experienced workers are less likely than representative workers to remain at the same plant in
the aftermath of an ownership change.  We also find that workers with the highest levels of
education have the greatest mobility across firms. 
Two-year mean wage growth results for this same set of workers are presented in Table 14. 
A potentially interesting finding is that women who work for establishments that were involved in
an ownership change experience higher wage growth than men.   It is important to note, however,
that we do not have information on hours worked.  Thus, one explanation for this finding, which
cannot be ruled out on the basis of our empirical analysis, is that women (who may relatively often
have worked part-time) work more hours in the aftermath of an ownership change.  The results also
                                                                                 
would be possible that ownership change could have occurred after the employee data were received in year T (not to
mention that new owners policies may take some time to come into effect).  If years T and T+1 were used, the
employee’s initial status normally would be recorded after ownership change occurred rather than before.33
imply that wage growth is higher for Swedish employees, younger, less-experienced workers, and
those with higher levels of education. 
E. Where Post-Ownership Change Employees Come From
Table 15 presents information on employees who are employed in a plant that recently
experienced an ownership change.  As in Table 12, we report the percentages of all employees at
these plants, and of employees newly coming to the plants, who match relevant employee
characteristics.  Also, as in Table 13, the bottom panel of the table reports pertinent sample sizes.
In Table 16, we reverse the analysis of Table 13 by identifying workers at the end of Year
T+1 and then determining their employment status at the end of year T-1.  The results presented in
Table 16 imply that plants involved in an ownership change are more likely to hire new workers
than plants that do not experience these transactions.  Table 17 presents two-year mean wage
growth results for the workers identified at the end of year T+1.  The results of Tables 15 and 16
indicate greater mobility and higher wage growth for Swedish employees, younger, less-experienced
workers, and those with higher levels of education. 
VII. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have generated some stylized facts concerning the consequences of
ownership change on productivity and investment in human capital.  The empirical analysis is based
on a rich matched employer-employee dataset, containing information on 19,010 Swedish
manufacturing plants for the years 1985-1998.  As such, our paper is the first plant-level study
based on evidence from Continental Europe and the first analysis of ownership change (in any
country) using matched employer-employee data.  In contrast to existing plant-level studies, we use34
more robust econometric methods, i.e., a one-stage analysis of the determinants of relative
productivity, including adjustments for survivor and measurement error biases. 
The results appear to confirm theories of ownership change predicting an improvement in
economic performance in the aftermath of such transactions.  Our findings are consistent with recent
theoretical and empirical evidence (see Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) and Maksimovic and Phillips
(2001, 2002)) suggesting that takeovers and asset sales result in the reallocation of a firm’s resources
to more efficient uses and to better managers.  Specifically, we find that establishments undergoing a
change in ownership are less productive (on average) than comparable establishments before a
transaction and experience an increase in productivity after a transaction.  Short term patterns (5
years before and after transactions) are different than long-term patterns (10 years before and after
transactions), a stylized fact that underscores the benefit of having a long panel. 
Plants involved in an ownership change have higher output and employment before the
transaction.  The increase in labor productivity after the transfer of ownership appears to be the
result of a decline in output, combined with an even larger reduction in employment.  We also find
that plants involved in an ownership change experience an upgrading in the “quality” of human
capital.  That is, we observe increases in average employee age, experience, and the percentage of
employees with a college education.  Ownership change also leads to an increase in wages and a
reduction in the percentage of female workers.  These patterns emerge most strongly for full
acquisitions and divestitures and unrelated acquisitions. 
In future work, we hope to implement the robustness tests outlined in Van Biesesbroeck
(2004), by using non-parametric and semi-parametric methods to calculate productivity and re-
estimating the various econometric models.  Given our large sample size, we can also analyze
whether there are significant differences across industries in the impacts of ownership change on35
economic performance and human capital.  Finally, it would be useful to discriminate among the
three theories that predict a positive effect on ownership change on economic performance: agency
theory, matching theories of ownership change, and the “capital upgrading” theory of ownership
change. 36
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The Extent of Which
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Labor Input Growth Rates Were
Lower For Plants Changing Owners
Than Comparable Plants Before the









Simple Sale: 9% Increase in
Employment, 5% Decline in Wages;
Assets-Only Sale: 5% Decline in
Employment, 5% Increase in Wages;
Mergers: 2% Increase in







45% of the Firms Involved in
Hostile Takeovers Laid Off Workers













Employment and Wages of
Non-production Workers (But Not
Production Workers) Declines
After an LBO;  No Evidence of a











Employment and Wage Growth is
Significantly Lower in Auxiliary
Establishments Changing Owners
Than in Those Not Changing
Owners, But Not for R&D
Employees; Much Smaller Effects at
Production Establishments 42
Table 2 (cont.)















Mergers and Spin-offs Had Very
Little Impact on Labor Costs;
Related Mergers Had a Positive
Impact on Wages; Mergers Had a
Negative Impact on Employment







For Representative Plants, Wages
and Employment Increase After
Ownership Change; Effects Worse









19% Decline in Employment for
Related Mergers; 8% Decline in







Mergers Do Not Reduce Labor
Demand in the U.S.; There is a 10%
Decline in Labor Demand in Europe






























1985 0.9 14.9 28.6 27.2 13.6 7.7 4.9 2.8
1986 0.4 14.4 28.3 28.0 13.2 8.0 5.1 2.7
1987 0.5 13.0 29.0 28.4 13.0 8.1 5.0 2.9
1988 0.6 13.0 28.8 28.4 13.0 8.0 5.3 2.8
1989 1.3 13.5 28.7 28.8 12.9 7.4 4.8 2.7
1990 5.2 6.6 30.0 29.9 13.0 7.7 5.0 2.7
1991 5.3 6.3 30.7 29.7 12.9 7.2 5.1 2.7
1992 5.9 6.6 31.2 28.8 12.6 7.2 5.1 2.7
1993 7.1 6.6 31.2 28.8 12.0 6.9 4.9 2.4
1994 6.7 5.6 30.5 30.5 12.5 6.8 5.0 2.4
1995 5.8 5.9 30.6 30.8 12.7 7.1 4.9 2.3
1996 5.2 6.7 31.7 29.8 12.8 6.8 4.8 2.2
1997 0.5 7.2 37.1 28.8 13.1 7.1 4.3 2.0
1998 0.3 6.7 37.1 29.2 13.5 6.9 4.4 1.9


















1985 0.0 1.4 5.1 10.6 11.4 13.6 18.6 39.2
1986 0.0 1.3 4.9 10.7 11.4 13.7 19.4 38.6
1987 0.0 1.2 4.9 10.7 11.1 13.8 18.9 39.3
1988 0.0 1.2 4.9 10.7 11.1 13.4 19.7 39.1
1989 0.0 1.3 5.2 11.6 11.7 13.2 19.0 38.0
1990 0.1 0.6 5.4 11.7 11.6 13.6 19.6 37.3
1991 0.1 0.6 5.5 11.7 11.5 12.9 19.8 37.9
1992 0.2 0.6 5.8 11.6 11.6 13.4 20.4 36.5
1993 0.2 0.6 6.0 12.2 11.5 13.2 20.6 35.7
1994 0.2 0.5 5.9 12.6 11.7 13.0 20.8 35.3
1995 0.2 0.6 5.8 12.5 11.7 13.0 20.2 36.1
1996 0.2 0.7 6.0 12.3 12.0 12.7 19.9 36.3
1997 0.0 0.7 7.5 13.0 13.5 14.7 19.1 31.6
1998 0.0 0.7 7.4 13.2 13.8 14.2 19.4 31.244
Table 4
Comparison of Size Distribution of Sample of Swedish Manufacturing Plants to
Population of Swedish Manufacturing Plants (Percentages)


















1986 0.4 14.4 28.3 28.0 13.2 8.0 5.1 2.7
1990 5.2 6.6 30.0 29.9 13.0 7.7 5.0 2.7
1995 5.8 5.9 30.6 30.8 12.7 7.1 4.9 2.3


















1986 33.1 22.4 16.1 13.8 6.7 4.0 2.3 1.3
1990 36.0 22.6 15.8 12.8 5.9 3.6 2.2 1.0
1995 38.5 23.4 14.8 12.2 5.3 3.0 1.9 0.845
Table 5
Sample Plants (N=19010) Relative to Population of Swedish Manufacturing Plants 
Variable 1986 1990 1995
% of Plants With More
Than 20 Employees




With More Than 20
Employees Included in
Our Sample 92.0% 95.7% 98.6%
% of Plants With More
Than 10 Employees




With More Than 10
Employees Included in
Our Sample 89.7% 92.4% 94.7%
% of Plants With More
Than 5 Employees




With More Than 5
Employees Included in
Our Sample 84.9% 87.0% 90.7%46
Table 6
Incidence of Ownership Change for 19,010 Swedish Manufacturing Plants During 1986-1998









1986 3.2% 3.1% 3.3%
1987 4.3% 5.2% 5.7%
1988 5.5% 8.3% 7.5%
1989 5.0% 5.1% 5.6%
1990 4.8% 7.7% 8.2%
1991 4.8% 7.8% 7.4%
1992 5.6% 5.0% 5.7%
1993 6.0% 4.7% 5.2%
1994 4.6% 7.3% 6.7%
1995 3.9% 6.0% 5.3%
1996 3.9% 2.1% 3.1%
1997 3.7% 4.7% 3.8%
1998 3.2% 2.3% 3.0%
Entire Period 5.1% 5.4% 5.6%47
Table 7
Incidence of Ownership Change for 19,010 Swedish Manufacturing Plants During 1986-1998




Involved in a Particular
Type of  Ownership
Change
% of Value-Added








Changes 5.1% 5.3% 5.6%
Full Acquisition 4.2% 2.7% 3.2%
Partial Acquisition 0.9% 2.6% 2.4%
Full Divestiture 4.5% 3.3% 3.9%
Partial Divestiture 0.7% 2.0% 1.8%
Related Acquisition 0.9% 1.2% 1.4%
Unrelated Acquisition 0.6% 0.8% 0.6%
Change in Ownership
Involving a Single Firm
3.7% 3.4% 3.7%48
Table 8
Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) of
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Parameter Estimates from Labor Productivity, Total Factor Productivity, Output, and Employment
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Industry Dummies       Yes       Yes     Yes     Yes
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     2.084 ***       
     (.143)
  10.610 ***
    (.059)
  4.049 ***
  (.049)
R
2 0.859      0.960     0.358    0.301
Number of Plants 18,495       15946 18,513   18,962
Number of
Observations   124,381
 
     82307 124,441 125,416
Notes: † p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.  These are two-tailed significance levels using
robust standard errors, allowing for correlated (“clustered”) errors within plants.  
‡ Weighted means
of industry-specific coefficients at the detailed (4-digit SIC) industry level.51
Table 10
Estimated Effects of Ownership Change on Labor Productivity (LP), Total Factor Productivity
(TFP), Output, and Employment for Various Types of Ownership Changes
All Ownership Changes
Period LP TFP Output Employment
Pre-Ownership Change
(Average-5 years Before)
-0.042 *** -0.038 ** 0.179 *** 0.209 ***
Post-Ownership Change
(Average-5 years After)
-0.001 -0.021 ** 0.093 *** 0.089 ***
Post-Pre 0.041 *** 0.017 ** -0.086 *** -0.120 ***
Full Acquisitions
Period LP TFP Output Employment
Pre-Ownership Change
(Average-5 years Before)
-0.055 *** -0.038 *** 0.061 ** 0.111 ***
Post-Ownership Change
(Average-5 years After)
-0.007 -0.024 *** -0.055 ** -0.046 **
Post-Pre 0.047 *** 0.014 * -0.116 *** -0.156 ***
Partial Acquisitions
Period LP TFP Output Employment
Pre-Ownership Change
(Average-5 years Before)
0.011 -0.037 * 0.633 *** 0.584 ***
Post-Ownership Change
(Average-5 years After)
0.019 -0.011 0.556 *** 0.510 ***
Post-Pre 0.008 0.026 † -0.076 * -0.073 *
Full Divestitures
Period LP TFP Output Employment
Pre-Ownership Change
(Average-5 years Before)
-0.052 *** -0.039 *** 0.092 *** 0.137 ***
Post-Ownership Change
(Average-5 years After)
-0.005 -0.022 *** -0.012 -0.007
Post-Pre 0.047 *** 0.017 ** -0.104 *** -0.144 ***
Partial Divestitures
Period LP TFP Output Employment
Pre-Ownership Change
(Average-5 years Before)
0.019 -0.030 † 0.684 *** 0.628 ***
Post-Ownership Change
(Average-5 years After)
0.018 -0.014 0.594 *** 0.551 ***
Post-Pre -0.001 0.015 † -0.090 * -0.077 *
Notes: † p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.  These are two-tailed significance levels using robust
standard errors, allowing for correlated (“clustered”) errors within plants.52
Table 10 (cont.)
Estimated Effects of Ownership Change on Labor Productivity (LP), Total Factor Productivity
(TFP), Output, and Employment for Various Types of Ownership Changes
Related Acquisitions
Period LP TFP Output Employment
Pre-Ownership Change
(Average-5 years Before)
0.005 -0.043 *** † 0.429 *** 0.402 ***
Post-Ownership Change
(Average-5 years After)
0.021 -0.009 0.363 *** 0.324 ***
Post-Pre 0.015 0.034 * -0.066 † -0.079 *
Unrelated Acquisitions
Period LP TFP Output Employment
Pre-Ownership Change
(Average-5 years Before)
-0.013 -0.034 * 0.345 *** 0.346 ***
Post-Ownership Change
(Average-5 years After)
0.020 -0.010 0.234 *** 0.208 ***
Post-Pre 0.033 * 0.024 -0.111 † -0.138 **
Change in Ownership Involving a Single Firm
Period LP TFP Output Employment
Pre-Ownership Change
(Average-5 years Before)
-0.059 *** -0.037 ** 0.087 ** 0.137 ***
Post-Ownership Change
(Average-5 years After)
-0.007 -0.024 ** 0.014 0.020
Post-Pre 0.052 *** 0.013 † -0.075 *** -0.118 ***
Notes: † p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.  These are two-tailed significance levels using robust
standard errors, allowing for correlated (“clustered”) errors within plants.53
Table 11
Estimated Effects of Ownership Change on Age, Experience, % Female, % Non-Swedish,
% College-Educated, and Wages for Various Types of Ownership Changes
All Ownership Changes
















years After) 0.213  *** 0.213  *** 0.117 0.245 0.126 0.004 †
Post-Pre 0.160 * 0.167 ** -0.649 ** -0.114 0.177 *  0.013 ***
Full Acquisitions















years After) 0.128† 0.176** -0.289 0.111 0.028 0.001
Post-Pre 0.154 * 0.167 ** -0.829*** -0.143 0.140 †   0.015***
Partial Acquisitions
















years After) 0.482  *** 0.339  *** 1.423 ** 0.674 * 0.438 ** 0.015 **
Post-Pre 0.086 0.136 -0.257 -0.113 0.213 0.003
Notes: † p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.  These are two-tailed significance levels using robust
standard errors, allowing for correlated (“clustered”) errors within plants.54
Table 11 (cont.)
Estimated Effects of Ownership Change on Age, Experience, % Female, % Non-Swedish,
% College-Educated, and Wages for Various Types of Ownership Changes
Full Divestitures
















years After) 0.177 * 0.210  *** -0.241 0.185 0.020 0.003
Post-Pre 0.157 * 0.177 ** -0.830  *** -0.126 0.109 0.013  ***
Partial Divestitures
















years After) 0.383 ** 0.230 * 1.895 ** 0.551 0.647 ** 0.011
Post-Pre 0.113 0.096 0.063 -0.110 0.434 0.014 †
Notes: † p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.  These are two-tailed significance levels using robust
standard errors, allowing for correlated (“clustered”) errors within plants.55
Table 11 (cont.)
Estimated Effects of Ownership Change on Age, Experience, % Female, % Non-Swedish,
% College-Educated, and Wages for Various Types of Ownership Changes
Related Acquisitions














years After) 0.495 ** 0.225 † 0.137 -0.080 0.196 0.025  ***
Post-Pre 0.037 0.218 -0.697 -0.398 0.197 0.007
Unrelated Acquisitions














years After) 0.754  *** 0.481 ** 1.150 0.332 0.133 0.014 *
Post-Pre 0.571 ** 0.193 † 0.282 0.294 0.053 0.020 *
Change in Ownership Involving a Single Firm














years After) 0.090 0.180 ** -0.083 0.315 † 0.109 -0.002
Post-Pre 0.167 0.153 -0.727 -0.103 0.205 * 0.015  ***
Notes: † p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.  These are two-tailed significance levels using robust
standard errors, allowing for correlated (“clustered”) errors within plants.56
Table 12
Which Employees Go:

























% Female 26.38 27.45 27.80 26.93 26.99 28.56 28.05 27.79 27.19
% Non-Swedish 12.60 14.23 13.77 14.91 13.59 15.80 13.50 11.33 14.87
% Age Above Mean 47.81 49.12 50.26 47.46 50.39 46.05 48.17 48.59 49.51
% Experience Above Mean 50.98 49.72 50.79 48.13 50.86 47.06 49.88 52.32 49.30
% Education Less Than High School 39.40 41.00 40.88 41.18 41.51 39.75 40.69 41.03 41.11
% Education to High School 48.27 47.35 47.46 47.19 47.32 47.42 47.87 47.47 47.15
% Education Some College 12.09 11.37 11.30 11.49 10.84 12.68 11.18 11.32 11.45
% Education Some PhD 0.24 0.27 0.37 0.14 0.33 0.15 0.26 0.18 0.29
Among Employees Leaving Plant:
% Female 28.50 28.07 28.33 27.64 28.05 28.13 29.66 30.60 27.35
% Non-Swedish 14.12 15.28 15.24 15.35 15.00 16.04 14.95 12.81 15.64
% Age Above Mean 39.15 45.35 46.49 43.48 46.83 41.36 42.73 43.75 46.25
% Experience Above Mean 36.45 40.04 41.45 37.66 41.52 36.18 38.18 42.45 40.32
% Education Less Than High School 37.30 38.75 38.66 38.89 39.32 37.19 38.40 37.42 39.00
% Education to High School 48.91 47.82 48.13 47.29 48.00 47.31 48.82 48.41 47.48
% Education Some College 13.52 13.08 12.75 13.63 12.27 15.30 12.49 13.91 13.15
% Education Some PhD 0.27 0.35 0.45 0.19 0.41 0.21 0.30 0.27 0.38
Sample Size for All Employees:
All 6,586,368 352,094 208,526 143,568 249,265 102,829 81,442 32,011 238,641
With Experience Data 2,690,062 135,380 80,717 54,663 94,745 40,635 32,928 12,512 89,940
With Education Data 6,358,300 338,494 200,926 137,568 240,284 98,210 78,149 31,055 229,290
Sample Size for Employees Leaving Plant :
All 1,782,949 131,495 81,930 49,565 96,059 35,436 26,049 10,572 94,874
With Experience Data 802,542 52,952 33,261 19,691 38,284 14,668 11,384 4,514 37,054
With Education Data 1,699,355 125,363 78,353 47,010 91,913 33,450 24,693 10,168 90,50257
Table 13
Where Employees Go:
Employment Status at the End of Year T+1 (in %) of Workers at Year T-1 Whose Plants Experienced an Ownership Change During Year T
All Employees























Same Plant 72.9 62.7 60.7 65.5 61.5 65.5 68.0 67.0 60.2
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.5 2.1 2.9 1.1 1.4 2.8
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm 0.0 2.4 2.7 2.1 2.5 2.3 2.9 2.2 2.3
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.8 2.8 2.1 3.9 2.5 3.5 1.1 1.5 3.6
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 4.1 6.2 6.4 5.8 6.2 6.1 4.8 5.4 6.8
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry,
Other Firm 4.9 5.9 6.2 5.5 6.1 5.4 5.3 5.1 6.2
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.4 2.5 2.7 2.1 2.8 1.6 1.8 2.9 2.6
Unemployed (at least in Sweden) 12.6 15.2 17.0 12.6 16.3 12.7 15.0 14.5 15.458
Table 13 (cont.)
Where Employees Go:
Employment Status at the End of Year T+1 (in %) of Workers at Year T-1 Whose Plants Experienced an Ownership Change During Year T
Male Employees























Same Plant 73.7 63.0 61.0 65.8 62.0 65.3 68.7 68.3 60.3
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.6 2.2 3.1 1.2 1.5 3.0
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm 0.0 2.2 2.3 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.8 2.2 2.0
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.9 3.0 2.2 4.0 2.7 3.8 1.2 1.5 3.8
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 4.5 6.9 7.4 6.2 7.1 6.5 5.2 5.7 7.6
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 4.9 6.0 6.3 5.6 6.1 5.7 5.3 5.0 6.4
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.5 2.6 2.9 2.3 2.9 1.9 1.8 3.0 2.9
Unemployed (at least in Sweden) 11.4 13.9 15.6 11.3 14.8 11.5 13.7 12.9 14.1
Female Employees























Same Plant 70.8 61.8 60.0 64.6 60.0 66.1 66.2 63.6 60.0
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 2.1 1.9 1.7 2.2 1.8 2.2 1.0 1.4 2.3
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm 0.0 3.1 3.6 2.3 3.4 2.4 3.2 2.3 3.2
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.6 2.4 1.7 3.4 2.2 2.9 0.8 1.6 3.1
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 3.1 4.4 4.1 4.8 4.0 5.1 3.5 4.6 4.6
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 4.9 5.7 6.0 5.1 6.1 4.7 5.3 5.1 5.9
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.4 2.0 2.2 1.6 2.4 1.0 1.8 2.7 1.9
Unemployed (at least in Sweden) 16.2 18.8 20.7 16.0 20.2 15.7 18.3 18.8 19.059
Table 13 (cont.)
Where Employees Go:
Employment Status at the End of Year T+1 (in %) of Workers at Year T-1 Whose Plants Experienced an Ownership Change During Year T
Swedish Employees























Same Plant 73.4 63.1 61.4 65.7 62.1 65.6 68.6 67.5 60.6
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 2.2 2.3 2.1 2.5 2.0 2.8 1.2 1.5 2.8
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm 0.0 2.5 2.8 2.0 2.6 2.3 3.0 2.3 2.3
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.8 2.8 2.1 3.9 2.5 3.6 1.1 1.5 3.6
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 4.2 6.2 6.4 6.0 6.2 6.2 4.8 5.2 6.9
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 5.1 6.2 6.4 5.8 6.4 5.7 5.6 5.2 6.5
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.5 2.5 2.6 2.2 2.8 1.7 1.8 3.0 2.6
Unemployed (at least in Sweden) 11.9 14.4 16.1 11.9 15.4 12.0 14.0 13.8 14.6
Non-Swedish Employees























Same Plant 69.7 59.9 56.5 64.5 57.5 65.0 64.6 62.7 58.2
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.6 2.2 3.0 0.9 1.1 3.0
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm 0.0 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.1 2.3 2.7 1.5 2.1
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.9 2.8 2.2 3.5 2.7 2.9 0.9 2.2 3.4
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 3.7 6.0 6.8 4.9 6.3 5.3 4.4 6.3 6.4
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 3.4 4.2 4.5 3.8 4.5 3.7 3.3 3.7 4.6
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.3 2.3 2.8 1.6 2.9 1.1 2.0 2.2 2.4
Unemployed (at least in Sweden) 17.7 20.2 22.7 16.8 21.8 16.7 21.2 20.3 19.860
Table 13 (cont.)
Where Employees Go:
Employment Status at the End of Year T+1 (in %) of Workers at Year T-1 Whose Plants Experienced an Ownership Change During Year T
Employees Whose Age is Below the Mean























Same Plant 68.4 59.9 57.7 62.9 58.7 62.5 64.7 63.9 57.7
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 2.2 2.0 1.8 2.1 1.7 2.4 1.0 1.3 2.4
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm 0.0 2.3 2.4 2.0 2.3 2.1 2.5 2.0 2.2
Same Industry, Other Firm 2.1 3.0 2.3 3.9 2.6 3.8 1.3 1.5 3.8
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 5.9 7.8 8.1 7.3 7.9 7.5 6.2 7.2 8.4
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 7.1 8.1 8.6 7.5 8.5 7.4 7.2 7.1 8.6
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.6 2.6 2.7 2.4 2.9 1.9 2.0 3.1 2.7
Unemployed (at least in Sweden) 12.7 14.5 16.3 11.9 15.4 12.3 15.0 13.8 14.4
Employees Whose Age is Above the Mean























Same Plant 77.8 65.5 63.7 68.4 64.2 69.1 71.6 70.3 62.9
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 2.2 2.7 2.5 2.9 2.4 3.4 1.2 1.6 3.3
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm 0.0 2.6 2.9 2.2 2.7 2.4 3.4 2.4 2.4
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.5 2.6 1.9 3.8 2.4 3.2 0.8 1.6 3.4
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 2.2 4.6 4.8 4.2 4.6 4.4 3.3 3.4 5.2
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 2.4 3.6 3.8 3.3 3.8 3.1 3.2 2.9 3.9
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.2 2.3 2.7 1.9 2.7 1.3 1.6 2.7 2.6
Unemployed (at least in Sweden) 12.6 16.0 17.8 13.4 17.1 13.2 15.0 15.3 16.561
Table 13 (cont.)
Where Employees Go:
Employment Status at the End of Year T+1 (in %) of Workers at Year T-1 Whose Plants Experienced an Ownership Change During Year T
Employees Whose Experience is Below the Mean























Same Plant 61.3 53.4 51.0 56.7 51.9 56.5 57.4 56.5 51.5
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 2.1 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.2 1.4 2.0
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm 0.0 2.3 2.4 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.4 1.9 2.4
Same Industry, Other Firm 2.2 2.9 2.4 3.5 2.6 3.6 1.6 1.6 3.5
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 7.4 9.1 9.4 8.7 9.2 9.0 7.7 9.0 9.7
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 9.1 10.4 10.6 10.0 10.6 9.9 9.4 9.3 10.8
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.7 2.5 2.7 2.2 2.8 1.8 2.2 3.1 2.5
Unemployed (at least in Sweden) 16.1 17.7 19.8 14.9 19.0 15.1 18.2 17.4 17.6
Employees Whose Experience is Above the Mean























Same Plant 78.7 68.5 66.4 71.8 67.0 72.2 73.5 70.7 66.3
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 2.6 2.0 1.8 2.3 1.8 2.4 1.3 1.6 2.3
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm 0.0 3.3 4.0 2.2 3.7 2.5 3.4 2.9 3.4
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.8 2.6 2.0 3.4 2.2 3.4 0.9 1.6 3.3
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 3.7 5.8 5.9 5.7 5.9 5.8 5.2 6.1 6.0
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 4.3 6.0 6.1 5.7 6.1 5.6 5.3 5.3 6.3
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.2 1.9 2.2 1.6 2.3 1.0 1.6 2.6 2.0
Unemployed (at least in Sweden) 7.6 9.9 11.5 7.2 11.0 7.1 8.8 9.3 10.462
Table 13 (cont.)
Where Employees Go:
Employment Status at the End of Year T+1 (in %) of Workers at Year T-1 Whose Plants Experienced an Ownership Change During Year T
Employees With Less Than A High School Education























Same Plant 74.7 65.0 63.1 67.7 63.8 68.1 70.2 70.1 62.6
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 1.7 2.4 2.2 2.5 2.0 3.1 1.1 1.5 2.9
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm 0.0 2.0 2.1 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.7 1.6 1.8
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.5 2.4 1.6 3.5 2.1 3.1 0.9 1.0 3.1
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 3.0 4.7 4.9 4.4 4.8 4.5 3.2 3.5 5.4
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 3.4 4.0 4.4 3.5 4.4 3.2 3.7 3.1 4.2
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.4 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.6 1.7 1.6 2.4 2.6
Unemployed (at least in Sweden) 14.3 17.2 19.3 14.2 18.4 14.2 16.6 16.7 17.4
Employees With a High School Education























Same Plant 72.9 62.6 60.5 65.8 61.2 66.0 67.8 66.6 60.3
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.0 2.6 1.2 1.4 2.6
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm 0.0 2.3 2.6 1.9 2.4 2.1 3.0 2.5 2.0
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.8 2.9 2.1 4.0 2.5 3.7 1.1 1.6 3.7
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 4.5 6.9 7.1 6.5 6.9 6.6 5.5 5.5 7.5
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 5.4 6.5 6.8 6.0 6.8 5.7 5.9 5.7 6.8
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.4 2.5 2.7 2.1 2.8 1.6 1.6 3.1 2.7
Unemployed (at least in Sweden) 11.7 14.2 16.1 11.5 15.3 11.7 13.9 13.6 14.463
Table 13 (cont.)
Where Employees Go:
Employment Status at the End of Year T+1 (in %) of Workers at Year T-1 Whose Plants Experienced an Ownership Change During Year T
Employees With At Least Some College or University Education























Same Plant 70.1 57.4 56.0 59.5 56.7 58.9 64.7 59.8 54.7
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 3.8 2.6 2.2 3.2 2.4 3.1 1.6 1.7 3.1
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm 0.0 4.7 5.4 3.6 4.9 4.1 4.0 3.6 5.0
Same Industry, Other Firm 2.7 3.8 3.3 4.6 3.6 4.2 1.7 2.7 4.7
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 5.5 8.1 8.3 7.7 8.0 8.2 6.6 10.3 8.2
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 7.2 10.2 9.9 10.7 9.7 11.3 8.7 8.8 10.9
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.4 2.4 2.8 1.9 2.9 1.3 2.6 3.0 2.3
Unemployed (at least in Sweden) 9.3 10.8 12.1 8.9 11.8 8.8 10.1 10.2 11.1
Employees With a Ph.D.























Same Plant 70.0 52.4 52.2 53.1 52.4 52.7 64.6 52.6 48.6
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 5.4 3.1 2.4 5.7 2.7 5.5 0.5 0.0 4.2
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm 0.0 16.8 20.2 3.6 19.2 4.1 10.2 1.8 20.1
Same Industry, Other Firm 2.9 4.1 3.7 5.7 3.8 5.5 1.9 0.0 5.1
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 4.9 4.7 4.1 7.3 4.0 8.9 3.4 8.8 4.8
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 6.0 6.9 5.8 10.9 6.0 11.6 7.8 12.3 6.2
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.9 2.8 2.4 4.2 3.1 1.4 2.9 22.8 1.1
Unemployed (at least in Sweden) 8.8 9.1 9.1 9.4 8.9 10.3 8.7 1.8 9.964
Table 14
Mean Two-Year Real Wage Growth of Employees Whose Plants Experienced an Ownership Change During Year T
All Employees























Same Plant 1.126 1.106 1.114 1.097 1.102 1.116 1.090 1.127 1.110
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 1.168 1.066 1.074 1.056 1.072 1.055 1.055 1.143 1.062
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm N/A 1.203 1.252 1.113 1.236 1.114 1.075 1.127 1.268
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.256 1.176 1.170 1.180 1.157 1.209 1.157 1.094 1.183
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 1.628 1.410 1.463 1.326 1.434 1.351 1.466 1.344 1.404
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry,
Other Firm 1.519 1.369 1.412 1.300 1.386 1.324 1.264 1.293 1.408
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.139 1.046 1.070 1.002 1.059 0.993 1.126 1.108 1.01865
Table 14 (cont.)
Mean Two-Year Real Wage Growth of Employees Whose Plants Experienced an Ownership Change During Year T
Male Employees























Same Plant 1.073 1.058 1.054 1.064 1.049 1.079 1.037 1.080 1.063
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 1.093 1.050 1.052 1.047 1.047 1.054 1.022 1.095 1.051
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm N/A 1.047 1.038 1.062 1.044 1.053 1.033 1.042 1.054
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.202 1.133 1.144 1.124 1.131 1.136 1.108 1.067 1.139
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 1.551 1.363 1.400 1.301 1.373 1.338 1.485 1.317 1.340
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 1.390 1.293 1.332 1.230 1.312 1.241 1.218 1.211 1.322
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.115 1.018 1.023 1.008 1.021 1.005 0.978 1.048 1.022
Female Employees























Same Plant 1.281 1.237 1.272 1.187 1.250 1.208 1.229 1.257 1.236
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 1.394 1.121 1.154 1.084 1.154 1.060 1.158 1.274 1.102
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm N/A 1.497 1.605 1.236 1.570 1.257 1.170 1.341 1.627
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.431 1.315 1.257 1.359 1.238 1.450 1.351 1.160 1.322
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 1.946 1.608 1.757 1.415 1.727 1.395 1.393 1.430 1.690
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 1.879 1.585 1.628 1.509 1.588 1.574 1.380 1.504 1.660
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.211 1.146 1.229 0.980 1.185 0.940 1.516 1.286 1.00266
Table 14 (cont.)
Mean Two-Year Real Wage Growth of Employees Whose Plants Experienced an Ownership Change During Year T
Swedish Employees























Same Plant 1.127 1.111 1.120 1.098 1.108 1.118 1.090 1.136 1.115
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 1.167 1.068 1.079 1.055 1.068 1.069 1.053 1.156 1.064
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm N/A 1.228 1.277 1.131 1.261 1.136 1.084 1.126 1.305
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.261 1.181 1.171 1.189 1.165 1.209 1.160 1.100 1.188
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 1.624 1.379 1.418 1.319 1.390 1.353 1.471 1.378 1.357
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 1.522 1.365 1.399 1.309 1.378 1.328 1.267 1.294 1.402
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.147 1.054 1.077 1.014 1.067 1.002 1.151 1.116 1.022
Non-Swedish Employees























Same Plant 1.119 1.078 1.068 1.091 1.063 1.107 1.088 1.049 1.079
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 1.177 1.053 1.046 1.061 1.098 0.985 1.069 1.010 1.053
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm N/A 1.032 1.042 1.020 1.051 0.996 1.007 1.143 1.034
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.228 1.142 1.165 1.123 1.107 1.212 1.127 1.060 1.149
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 1.653 1.606 1.729 1.380 1.712 1.341 1.431 1.124 1.691
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 1.484 1.411 1.530 1.221 1.459 1.289 1.221 1.283 1.464
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.075 0.992 1.029 0.906 1.005 0.921 0.985 1.020 0.99267
Table 14 (cont.)
Mean Two-Year Real Wage Growth of Employees Whose Plants Experienced an Ownership Change During Year T
Employees Whose Age is Below the Mean























Same Plant 1.263 1.236 1.254 1.213 1.234 1.239 1.203 1.244 1.247
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 1.316 1.176 1.182 1.168 1.189 1.155 1.142 1.192 1.180
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm N/A 1.423 1.521 1.255 1.490 1.262 1.207 1.282 1.526
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.407 1.317 1.274 1.351 1.287 1.363 1.271 1.221 1.328
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 1.768 1.593 1.664 1.486 1.628 1.512 1.525 1.499 1.622
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 1.648 1.533 1.605 1.421 1.570 1.439 1.396 1.388 1.590
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.279 1.216 1.284 1.110 1.250 1.099 1.353 1.242 1.175
Employees Whose Age is Above the Mean























Same Plant 0.995 0.984 0.988 0.979 0.983 0.986 0.979 1.014 0.981
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 1.006 0.982 0.994 0.966 0.988 0.971 0.976 1.100 0.975
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm N/A 1.009 1.028 0.970 1.026 0.958 0.968 0.993 1.030
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.028 1.010 1.043 0.985 1.016 0.997 0.949 0.963 1.017
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 1.208 1.088 1.129 1.015 1.109 1.030 1.345 0.994 1.042
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 1.110 0.988 0.984 0.995 0.985 0.998 0.943 1.042 0.995
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 0.940 0.854 0.855 0.852 0.860 0.820 0.807 0.941 0.85268
Table 14 (cont.)
Mean Two-Year Real Wage Growth of Employees Whose Plants Experienced an Ownership Change During Year T
Employees Whose Experience is Below the Mean























Same Plant 1.321 1.311 1.351 1.260 1.324 1.286 1.227 1.392 1.333
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 1.359 1.311 1.300 1.328 1.301 1.334 1.222 1.273 1.334
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm N/A 1.285 1.279 1.296 1.291 1.274 1.254 1.439 1.281
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.472 1.449 1.356 1.538 1.371 1.570 1.399 1.217 1.470
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 1.847 1.627 1.681 1.545 1.642 1.592 1.525 1.565 1.663
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 1.685 1.528 1.579 1.452 1.563 1.447 1.422 1.573 1.556
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.365 1.375 1.486 1.186 1.415 1.240 1.711 1.354 1.272
Employees Whose Experience is Above the Mean























Same Plant 1.158 1.128 1.133 1.121 1.123 1.141 1.116 1.098 1.138
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 1.196 1.058 1.061 1.054 1.064 1.046 1.042 1.125 1.055
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm N/A 1.490 1.607 1.160 1.574 1.175 1.151 1.181 1.656
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.193 1.146 1.145 1.147 1.160 1.124 1.084 1.250 1.145
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 1.343 1.217 1.251 1.163 1.217 1.219 1.182 1.098 1.247
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 1.328 1.218 1.172 1.294 1.171 1.346 1.136 1.123 1.255
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.097 0.966 0.962 0.974 0.982 0.873 0.927 1.081 0.95569
Table 14 (cont.)
Mean Two-Year Real Wage Growth of Employees Whose Plants Experienced an Ownership Change During Year T
Employees With Less Than A High School Education























Same Plant 1.070 1.059 1.065 1.050 1.055 1.067 1.047 1.151 1.049
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 1.115 1.016 1.040 0.985 1.030 0.992 1.025 1.146 1.006
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm N/A 1.030 1.011 1.061 1.018 1.061 0.995 1.026 1.049
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.224 1.129 1.117 1.137 1.116 1.152 1.115 1.053 1.134
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 1.668 1.486 1.606 1.292 1.550 1.314 1.693 1.395 1.452
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 1.595 1.466 1.581 1.261 1.517 1.290 1.265 1.212 1.552
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.076 0.995 1.003 0.983 1.005 0.959 0.931 1.131 0.992
Employees With a High School Education























Same Plant 1.157 1.126 1.124 1.129 1.116 1.150 1.121 1.107 1.131
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 1.179 1.097 1.118 1.069 1.113 1.067 1.100 1.125 1.095
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm N/A 1.351 1.455 1.142 1.427 1.135 1.131 1.157 1.494
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.265 1.179 1.186 1.174 1.175 1.185 1.139 1.156 1.185
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 1.583 1.342 1.379 1.283 1.349 1.322 1.294 1.366 1.352
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 1.495 1.320 1.313 1.331 1.308 1.354 1.279 1.380 1.325
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.177 1.041 1.049 1.025 1.048 1.010 0.983 1.126 1.04070
Table 14 (cont.)
Mean Two-Year Real Wage Growth of Employees Whose Plants Experienced an Ownership Change During Year T
Employees With At least Some College or University Education























Same Plant 1.177 1.191 1.246 1.116 1.220 1.131 1.088 1.117 1.242
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 1.211 1.101 1.037 1.165 1.041 1.196 0.995 1.236 1.109
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm N/A 1.193 1.209 1.158 1.200 1.174 1.119 1.210 1.210
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.264 1.256 1.174 1.340 1.169 1.415 1.321 1.051 1.264
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 1.602 1.342 1.338 1.348 1.314 1.399 1.357 1.161 1.368
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 1.463 1.316 1.338 1.285 1.319 1.309 1.186 1.178 1.364
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.205 1.035 1.049 1.006 1.035 1.036 1.075 1.052 1.017
Employees With a Ph.D.























Same Plant 1.084 1.121 1.130 1.086 1.121 1.120 0.963 0.952 1.201
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 1.068 0.948 0.920 0.995 0.938 0.977 0.956 N/A 0.948
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm N/A 1.076 1.068 1.244 1.067 1.284 0.985 1.004 1.090
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.111 1.072 1.108 0.983 1.098 0.975 1.431 N/A 1.030
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 1.203 0.965 0.951 0.997 0.949 1.006 0.956 0.947 0.970
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 1.032 0.935 0.961 0.883 0.951 0.891 0.921 1.033 0.924
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 0.902 8.836 12.335 0.963 9.501 0.855 35.536 0.943 0.60871
Table 15
Which Employees Come:

























% Female 26.14 27.70 27.71 27.69 26.80 29.71 28.09 26.10 27.80
% Non-Swedish 12.33 13.08 12.76 13.53 12.64 14.05 12.29 11.38 13.59
% Age Above Mean 48.75 49.58 50.57 48.16 50.74 47.00 50.39 51.40 49.04
% Experience Above Mean 57.16 57.09 58.44 55.18 58.50 54.12 58.96 61.44 55.79
% Education Less Than High School 36.62 38.10 38.83 37.07 39.21 35.66 37.99 37.64 38.21
% Education to High School 49.84 49.11 49.28 48.88 49.23 48.86 48.65 50.20 49.12
% Education Some College 13.28 12.48 11.58 13.78 11.28 15.16 13.01 11.99 12.37
% Education Some PhD 0.26 0.30 0.32 0.27 0.29 0.32 0.34 0.17 0.30
Among Employees Coming to Plant:
% Female 27.99 28.13 28.08 28.21 27.49 29.52 28.79 25.74 28.28
% Non-Swedish 13.16 12.53 13.23 11.43 13.02 11.46 11.84 13.04 12.64
% Age Above Mean 25.45 37.09 37.94 35.77 37.80 35.55 36.77 42.03 36.52
% Experience Above Mean 33.12 41.94 44.34 38.32 43.90 37.81 41.02 49.24 41.22
% Education Less Than High School 26.86 31.72 33.46 29.01 33.26 28.38 32.08 30.51 31.79
% Education to High School 55.01 52.56 52.86 52.09 53.16 51.25 52.11 54.34 52.43
% Education Some College 17.78 15.34 13.34 18.45 13.26 19.86 15.49 14.94 15.35
% Education Some PhD 0.35 0.38 0.34 0.45 0.32 0.52 0.32 0.21 0.42
Sample Size for All Employees:
All 6,239,988 351,269 206,600 144,669 242,149 109,120 80,883 33,991 236,395
With Experience Data 2,858,277 156,689 91,587 65,102 106,028 50,661 37,021 15,146 104,522
With Education Data 6,090,512 343,979 202,508 141,471 237,298 106,681 79,610 33,512 230,857
Sample Size for Employees Coming to Plant :
All 1,507,679 123,789 75,403 48,386 84,768 39,021 23,016 11,905 88,868
With Experience Data 910,481 65,410 39,357 26,053 44,365 21,045 12,658 6,208 46,544
With Education Data 1,445,262 120,071 73,124 46,947 82,222 37,849 22,503 11,672 85,89672
Table 16
Where Employees Come From:
Employment Status at the End of Year T-1 (in %) of Workers at Year T+1 Whose Plants Experienced an Ownership Change During Year T
All Employees























Same Plant 75.8 64.8 63.5 66.6 65.0 64.2 71.5 65.0 62.4
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 2.1 3.5 3.3 3.8 3.7 3.1 2.7 2.8 3.9
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm 0.0 4.1 3.8 4.5 3.7 5.0 3.0 3.2 4.6
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.2 1.2 1.4 0.9 1.3 0.9 1.1 0.5 1.3
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 3.9 4.0 4.6 3.1 4.2 3.3 3.1 5.0 4.1
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry,
Other Firm 4.1 3.9 4.3 3.4 4.1 3.5 3.3 3.5 4.2
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.5 5.4 6.7 3.5 6.1 3.9 5.2 7.6 5.1
Unemployed (at least in Sweden) 11.2 13.2 12.4 14.3 11.9 16.1 10.0 12.4 14.473
Table 16 (cont.)
Where Employees Come From:
Employment Status at the End of Year T-1 (in %) of Workers at Year T+1 Whose Plants Experienced an Ownership Change During Year T
Male Employees























Same Plant 76.4 65.0 63.7 66.8 65.3 64.1 71.8 64.8 62.7
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 2.1 3.8 3.3 4.4 3.9 3.5 2.7 2.8 4.3
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm 0.0 3.8 3.4 4.4 3.3 5.0 2.9 3.0 4.2
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.3 1.2 1.5 0.9 1.3 1.0 1.2 0.5 1.3
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 4.3 4.3 5.1 3.2 4.7 3.5 3.3 5.3 4.6
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 3.9 3.8 4.2 3.2 4.0 3.3 3.1 3.4 4.0
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.5 5.7 7.3 3.5 6.5 4.0 5.7 8.2 5.4
Unemployed (at least in Sweden) 10.4 12.4 11.6 13.5 11.0 15.5 9.3 11.9 13.5
Female Employees























Same Plant 74.1 64.2 63.0 65.9 64.1 64.5 70.8 65.5 61.8
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 2.0 2.8 3.2 2.2 3.2 2.0 2.8 2.7 2.8
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm 0.0 4.8 4.9 4.8 4.8 5.0 3.4 4.0 5.5
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.1 1.1 1.2 0.9 1.2 0.9 0.8 0.4 1.3
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 2.9 2.9 3.2 2.6 3.0 2.8 2.5 4.1 2.9
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 4.8 4.4 4.6 4.0 4.6 3.9 3.7 3.6 4.7
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.6 4.5 5.3 3.4 5.0 3.6 4.0 5.9 4.5
Unemployed (at least in Sweden) 13.6 15.2 14.5 16.2 14.1 17.5 11.9 13.9 16.574
Table 16 (cont.)
Where Employees Come From:
Employment Status at the End of Year T-1 (in %) of Workers at Year T+1 Whose Plants Experienced an Ownership Change During Year T
Swedish Employees























Same Plant 76.1 64.5 63.7 65.7 65.1 63.2 71.4 65.6 62.0
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 2.1 3.6 3.4 3.9 3.8 3.0 2.8 2.8 4.0
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm 0.0 4.0 3.5 4.6 3.4 5.2 3.0 3.2 4.4
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.2 1.2 1.4 0.9 1.3 1.0 1.1 0.5 1.4
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 4.0 4.0 4.6 3.1 4.3 3.4 3.2 4.9 4.2
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 4.3 4.1 4.5 3.6 4.3 3.7 3.5 3.5 4.5
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.5 5.6 6.9 3.7 6.2 4.2 5.2 7.4 5.5
Unemployed (at least in Sweden) 10.8 12.9 11.9 14.4 11.4 16.4 9.9 12.1 14.1
Non-Swedish Employees























Same Plant 74.2 66.2 62.2 71.8 63.9 70.9 72.6 59.9 65.1
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 2.3 3.0 2.7 3.5 3.0 3.2 2.7 2.6 3.2
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm 0.0 4.8 5.6 3.8 5.3 3.9 3.2 3.7 5.5
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.1 0.9 1.1 0.7 1.1 0.7 0.9 0.5 1.0
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 3.5 3.5 4.1 2.8 3.8 3.0 2.1 5.8 3.7
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 2.8 2.6 3.0 2.1 2.8 2.1 2.3 2.8 2.7
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.6 4.1 5.7 2.0 5.2 2.0 5.1 9.6 3.1
Unemployed (at least in Sweden) 14.3 14.7 15.6 13.4 14.9 14.3 11.2 15.2 15.775
Table 16 (cont.)
Where Employees Come From:
Employment Status at the End of Year T-1 (in %) of Workers at Year T+1 Whose Plants Experienced an Ownership Change During Year T
Employees Whose Age is Below the Mean























Same Plant 64.9 56.0 54.2 58.6 55.8 56.5 63.7 58.2 53.2
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 1.9 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.3 2.2 2.4 2.3 3.2
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm 0.0 3.7 3.4 4.0 3.3 4.5 2.5 2.5 4.2
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.0 1.4 1.0 1.1 0.5 1.4
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 5.5 5.3 6.1 4.2 5.8 4.4 4.1 6.2 5.6
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 5.8 5.4 5.7 4.9 5.6 4.8 4.4 5.0 5.7
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.7 5.2 6.3 3.5 5.7 4.0 4.6 7.3 5.1
Unemployed (at least in Sweden) 19.0 20.2 19.8 20.8 19.1 22.5 17.2 17.9 21.6
Employees Whose Age is Above the Mean























Same Plant 87.4 73.6 72.6 75.2 73.9 73.0 79.2 71.4 72.0
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 2.3 4.1 3.6 4.7 4.1 4.0 3.1 3.2 4.5
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm 0.0 4.5 4.2 5.0 4.1 5.6 3.5 3.9 5.0
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.0 1.1 1.3 0.8 1.2 0.8 1.1 0.4 1.2
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 2.3 2.6 3.1 1.8 2.8 2.1 2.0 3.8 2.6
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 2.4 2.5 2.9 1.9 2.7 2.0 2.3 2.0 2.7
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.4 5.6 7.1 3.4 6.4 3.7 5.8 8.0 5.2
Unemployed (at least in Sweden) 3.1 6.0 5.2 7.2 4.8 8.9 2.9 7.2 6.976
Table 16 (cont.)
Where Employees Come From:
Employment Status at the End of Year T-1 (in %) of Workers at Year T+1 Whose Plants Experienced an Ownership Change During Year T
Employees Whose Experience is Below the Mean























Same Plant 50.3 43.5 42.4 44.9 43.4 43.7 50.9 46.0 40.8
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 1.6 2.5 2.6 2.3 3.0 1.4 2.3 1.9 2.6
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm 0.0 3.3 2.9 4.0 2.8 4.3 2.3 2.2 3.8
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.5 1.2 1.4 0.9 1.4 0.9 1.1 0.7 1.3
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 6.7 6.4 7.3 5.3 7.0 5.4 5.0 8.0 6.7
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 7.4 7.0 7.4 6.6 7.3 6.6 5.9 6.6 7.5
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.7 4.5 4.9 4.0 4.6 4.5 3.4 6.0 4.7
Unemployed (at least in Sweden) 30.9 31.4 31.0 32.0 30.4 33.3 29.0 28.6 32.6
Employees Whose Experience is Above the Mean























Same Plant 81.5 69.3 67.4 72.2 68.6 71.0 76.2 67.2 67.1
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 2.4 3.4 3.3 3.6 4.0 2.2 2.4 3.2 3.9
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm 0.0 4.7 4.3 5.2 4.1 6.0 3.5 3.3 5.3
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.1 0.4 1.5
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 3.9 4.0 4.7 2.9 4.3 3.2 3.1 5.0 4.2
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 4.1 4.0 4.4 3.5 4.3 3.5 3.2 3.7 4.4
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.2 5.6 7.4 3.0 6.6 3.3 5.4 8.8 5.2
Unemployed (at least in Sweden) 5.5 7.6 7.0 8.5 6.8 9.6 5.2 8.4 8.477
Table 16 (cont.)
Where Employees Come From:
Employment Status at the End of Year T-1 (in %) of Workers at Year T+1 Whose Plants Experienced an Ownership Change During Year T
Employees With Less Than A High School Education























Same Plant 82.6 70.9 68.9 74.0 70.6 71.8 76.1 71.8 69.0
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 1.8 3.8 3.3 4.5 3.6 4.2 2.9 2.8 4.2
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm 0.0 3.8 3.9 3.7 3.7 4.1 2.8 2.7 4.3
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.0 1.0 1.3 0.7 1.2 0.7 0.9 0.5 1.2
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 2.8 2.9 3.4 2.3 3.1 2.5 2.3 3.8 3.0
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 2.8 2.6 2.9 2.2 2.8 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.8
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.5 5.5 7.3 2.8 6.6 2.8 6.2 6.9 5.0
Unemployed (at least in Sweden) 7.4 9.4 9.1 9.9 8.5 11.7 6.5 9.3 10.4
Employees With a High School Education























Same Plant 73.8 62.6 61.3 64.6 62.6 62.8 69.7 62.3 60.3
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 2.0 3.3 3.1 3.7 3.7 2.5 2.4 2.7 3.8
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm 0.0 3.8 3.5 4.2 3.4 4.6 3.0 2.9 4.2
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.2 1.2 1.3 0.9 1.3 1.0 1.2 0.4 1.3
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 4.3 4.4 5.2 3.4 4.8 3.6 3.3 5.2 4.7
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 4.6 4.5 4.9 3.9 4.8 3.9 3.7 3.9 4.9
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups)Unemployed
(at least in Sweden) 1.5 5.3 6.8 3.0 6.1 3.4 5.0 8.5 4.9
Unemployed (at least in Sweden) 12.6 14.8 13.8 16.3 13.3 18.2 11.8 14.1 16.078
Table 16 (cont.)
Where Employees Come From:
Employment Status at the End of Year T-1 (in %) of Workers at Year T+1 Whose Plants Experienced an Ownership Change During Year T
Employees With At Least Some College or University Education 























Same Plant 68.2 57.1 58.4 55.6 59.3 53.5 66.4 56.6 53.8
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 3.4 3.3 4.1 2.4 4.3 1.7 3.7 3.3 3.2
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm 0.0 6.2 4.9 7.8 4.8 8.5 4.0 6.4 7.0
Same Industry, Other Firm 2.0 1.7 1.9 1.4 1.8 1.4 1.3 0.7 2.0
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 5.2 4.9 5.8 3.8 5.5 4.0 4.2 7.8 4.8
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 5.8 5.6 6.1 5.0 5.9 5.1 4.7 5.1 6.0
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.4 5.8 5.0 6.8 4.6 7.8 3.6 6.3 6.5
Unemployed (at least in Sweden) 13.9 15.3 13.8 17.2 13.8 17.8 12.3 13.8 16.6
Employees With a Ph.D.























Same Plant 67.9 55.0 61.3 44.5 61.1 43.0 74.0 56.1 47.5
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 4.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 4.0 2.9 4.0 1.8 3.6
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm 0.0 13.4 11.1 17.2 10.7 18.7 5.5 8.8 16.8
Same Industry, Other Firm 2.0 1.2 0.8 1.8 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.0
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 4.4 4.0 3.7 4.4 3.7 4.7 3.7 15.8 3.2
Other Non-Manufacturing Industry, Other
Firm 4.8 4.3 3.7 5.2 3.8 5.3 2.6 5.3 4.9
Unknown Industry or Plant (could include
Self-employed and/or Start-ups) 1.3 5.8 1.7 12.5 1.8 13.7 2.2 0.0 7.6
Unemployed (at least in Sweden) 14.9 12.8 14.0 10.7 14.1 10.2 6.6 10.5 15.479
Table 17
Mean Wage Growth of Post-Ownership Change Workers Classified By Pre-Ownership Change Employment Status
All Employees























Same Plant 1.126 1.113 1.114 1.113 1.103 1.137 1.093 1.131 1.119
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 1.176 1.077 1.092 1.059 1.088 1.048 1.062 1.090 1.080
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm N/A 1.187 1.192 1.182 1.189 1.185 1.207 1.087 1.193
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.359 1.253 1.256 1.245 1.261 1.229 1.234 1.494 1.246
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 1.774 1.533 1.471 1.665 1.504 1.614 1.453 1.513 1.55680
Table 17 (cont.)
Mean Wage Growth of Post-Ownership Change Workers Classified By Pre-Ownership Change Employment Status
Male Employees























Same Plant 1.073 1.061 1.056 1.067 1.051 1.082 1.041 1.081 1.065
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 1.084 1.068 1.079 1.057 1.078 1.044 1.059 1.090 1.068
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm N/A 1.069 1.031 1.111 1.041 1.112 1.095 1.024 1.068
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.321 1.240 1.247 1.222 1.243 1.227 1.224 1.395 1.235
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 1.692 1.500 1.423 1.674 1.445 1.670 1.414 1.463 1.528
Female Employees























Same Plant 1.281 1.253 1.267 1.234 1.247 1.265 1.229 1.271 1.260
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 1.456 1.108 1.126 1.070 1.122 1.065 1.069 1.091 1.124
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm N/A 1.430 1.485 1.349 1.466 1.360 1.450 1.221 1.446
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.485 1.292 1.285 1.303 1.312 1.234 1.272 1.858 1.272
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 2.120 1.657 1.670 1.633 1.753 1.444 1.584 1.696 1.67181
Table 17 (cont.)
Mean Wage Growth of Post-Ownership Change Workers Classified By Pre-Ownership Change Employment Status
Swedish Employees























Same Plant 1.127 1.118 1.120 1.116 1.108 1.142 1.093 1.140 1.125
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 1.178 1.084 1.095 1.071 1.095 1.053 1.064 1.100 1.087
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm N/A 1.149 1.138 1.163 1.142 1.161 1.219 1.105 1.138
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.362 1.251 1.255 1.242 1.259 1.226 1.227 1.405 1.250
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 1.765 1.522 1.458 1.658 1.479 1.645 1.448 1.531 1.540
Non-Swedish Employees























Same Plant 1.120 1.081 1.072 1.092 1.067 1.107 1.096 1.052 1.080
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 1.169 1.023 1.066 0.978 1.024 1.021 1.044 1.013 1.019
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm N/A 1.396 1.431 1.328 1.401 1.383 1.122 0.960 1.482
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.336 1.269 1.271 1.266 1.274 1.255 1.300 2.175 1.208
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 1.845 1.613 1.565 1.710 1.696 1.401 1.502 1.396 1.67382
Table 17 (cont.)
Mean Wage Growth of Post-Ownership Change Workers Classified By Pre-Ownership Change Employment Status
Employees Whose Age is Below the Mean























Same Plant 1.282 1.260 1.265 1.253 1.247 1.287 1.221 1.224 1.281
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 1.379 1.207 1.209 1.206 1.227 1.149 1.210 1.209 1.207
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm N/A 1.401 1.431 1.365 1.421 1.370 1.445 1.274 1.402
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.512 1.405 1.408 1.398 1.411 1.387 1.384 1.953 1.382
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 1.924 1.702 1.623 1.856 1.664 1.803 1.631 1.677 1.722
Employees Whose Age is Above the Mean























Same Plant 1.004 1.000 1.004 0.995 0.998 1.005 0.993 1.058 0.994
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 1.008 0.981 0.999 0.959 0.980 0.984 0.950 1.009 0.985
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm N/A 1.012 1.002 1.024 1.008 1.018 1.036 0.974 1.011
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.135 1.072 1.086 1.040 1.090 1.014 1.084 0.975 1.074
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 1.392 1.172 1.169 1.182 1.176 1.160 1.096 1.259 1.17483
Table 17 (cont.)
Mean Wage Growth of Post-Ownership Change Workers Classified By Pre-Ownership Change Employment Status
Employees Whose Experience is Below the Mean























Same Plant 1.407 1.420 1.467 1.362 1.437 1.389 1.327 1.533 1.442
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 1.452 1.438 1.359 1.554 1.459 1.354 1.357 1.413 1.464
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm N/A 1.376 1.309 1.439 1.335 1.428 1.505 1.424 1.347
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.775 1.636 1.651 1.605 1.626 1.664 1.604 2.704 1.579
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 2.275 1.978 1.954 2.021 1.976 1.981 1.864 2.018 2.000
Employees Whose Experience is Above the Mean























Same Plant 1.157 1.128 1.121 1.138 1.111 1.164 1.109 1.104 1.140
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 1.246 1.075 1.125 1.008 1.078 1.065 1.087 1.083 1.072
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm N/A 1.320 1.430 1.186 1.409 1.186 1.264 1.091 1.358
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.207 1.121 1.095 1.168 1.093 1.186 1.197 1.279 1.093
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 1.498 1.296 1.253 1.400 1.321 1.218 1.189 1.222 1.34084
Table 17 (cont.)
Mean Wage Growth of Post-Ownership Change Workers Classified By Pre-Ownership Change Employment Status
Employees With Less Than A High School Education























Same Plant 1.056 1.050 1.056 1.041 1.047 1.056 1.040 1.137 1.041
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 1.083 0.997 1.022 0.970 1.007 0.978 0.955 1.046 1.003
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm N/A 1.031 1.019 1.049 1.028 1.037 1.089 1.019 1.019
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.274 1.185 1.206 1.122 1.210 1.077 1.057 1.245 1.215
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 1.559 1.424 1.341 1.609 1.355 1.632 1.442 1.460 1.413
Employees With a High School Education























Same Plant 1.168 1.149 1.134 1.170 1.127 1.200 1.133 1.128 1.159
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 1.217 1.120 1.116 1.126 1.130 1.089 1.082 1.122 1.128
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm N/A 1.309 1.342 1.268 1.328 1.275 1.252 1.157 1.338
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.408 1.283 1.276 1.298 1.284 1.282 1.317 1.646 1.256
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 1.885 1.604 1.548 1.727 1.600 1.615 1.464 1.576 1.64285
Table 17 (cont.)
Mean Wage Growth of Post-Ownership Change Workers Classified By Pre-Ownership Change Employment Status
Employees With At Least Some College or University Education























Same Plant 1.186 1.197 1.247 1.133 1.224 1.147 1.111 1.133 1.244
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 1.222 1.181 1.208 1.125 1.170 1.225 1.262 1.091 1.161
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm N/A 1.192 1.204 1.182 1.194 1.190 1.323 1.049 1.183
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.365 1.263 1.276 1.241 1.270 1.246 1.217 1.745 1.250
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 1.773 1.504 1.454 1.595 1.457 1.610 1.489 1.434 1.524
Employees With a Ph.D.























Same Plant 1.092 1.130 1.138 1.112 1.129 1.132 1.017 0.958 1.216
Other Plant Owned By Same Firm 1.126 1.036 1.095 0.938 1.070 0.943 1.055 1.269 1.018
Other Plant Owned by Acquiring Firm N/A 1.091 1.061 1.123 1.058 1.128 1.000 0.941 1.109
Same Industry, Other Firm 1.225 1.087 1.251 0.970 1.149 1.001 1.306 1.079 0.963
Other Manufacturing Industry, Other Firm 1.141 1.205 1.097 1.357 1.110 1.353 1.017 1.035 1.35986
Figure 1
Graphs of the Coefficients on the Ownership Change Dummies in the LP Equation87
Figure 2
Graphs of the Coefficients on the Ownership Change Dummies in the TFP Equation88
Figure 3
Graph of the Coefficients on the Ownership Change Dummies in the Output Equation
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Figure 4
Graph of the Coefficients on the Ownership Change Dummies in the Employment Equation90
Figure 5
Graph of the Coefficients on the Ownership Change Dummies in the Mean Employee
Age Equation91
Figure 6
Graph of the Coefficients on the Ownership Change Dummies in the Mean
Employee Experience Equation92
Figure 7
Graph of the Coefficients on the Ownership Change Dummies in the Percentage Female Workers
Equation
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Figure 8
Graph of the Coefficients on the Ownership Change Dummies in the Percentage of Non-Swedish
Workers Equation94
Figure 9
Graph of the Coefficients on the Ownership Change Dummies in the Percentage of College-Educated
Workers Equation
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Figure 10
Graph of the Coefficients on the Ownership Change Dummies in the Mean Wage Equation